Archived from groups: comp.security.firewalls (
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Gary Algier wrote:
> I have been struggling with how to protect company laptops while not
> in the office, yet allow access to resources when here. The biggest
> problem is the whole "file sharing" boondoggle.
>
> Here's the situation:
>
> When in the office, I at least want to be able to allow my users
> to access the company file and print servers (which run Samba). They
> do not need to share files the other way (the laptop need not be
> a server) as they can always put files they want to share on
> a server.
>
<BIG SNIP>
It sounds like you are trying to control behavior of intelligent
users with dumb machines and software. It might work with some
users, some of the time, but it will never work with all the
users, all the time.
A half-way smart, half-way computer savvy user will be able to
break whatever you come up with, on any computer he physically
controls. Removing the CD and floppy drives, and protecting the
BIOS with a password would add some barriers . . . but it still
won't stop anyone who's determined.
And, if they've got a knowledgeable computer-savvy friend,
forget about it! I don't know of a way you can protect a Windows
system from someone with physical access, a Knoppix CD, and
another CD of DOS & Windows tools readily available on the
Internet. (For that matter, Linux systems can't be protected
in that situation, either: Linux was not designed to be secure
against someone with physical access.)
It's amazing how many posts you can find on Google from corp
laptop users trying to figure out how to break the controls or
limits on their systems, so they can browse porn at home, or
do personal work, and so on. You'd probably be dismayed to see
how much useful aid they get, toward those ends.
To make matters worse, you are chained (as are most of us) to a
Windows OS that has always been designed to make it easier and
easier for computer novices to 'do stuff', and that doesn't
make it very easy to setup users as "Power Users" with no other
privileges.
I'm guessing that your closest approach to what you want would
be achieved with a combination of a clear use policy; a punitive,
but reasonable, violation policy; a fair, but effective return
scan policy (scans before re-entry to the network, for both
policy violations and for malware); AND effective,
well-presented training explaining it all.
That's a pain, of course.