- Apr 10, 2007
- 135
- 0
- 18,680
Just for the heck of it, I decided to write a little op-ed type piece on AMD’s recent troubles. Please feel free to brutalize it 
Sorry, it's a little long....
“A lesson from history” – by EasyG
The fortunes of AMD in its struggle against Intel remind me not a little of the great German offensive against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941: a military undertaking codenamed Operation Barbarossa. Leave to one side for a moment the ideological underpinnings of the Russo-German conflict, and what Barbarossa is illustrative of is the danger attendant upon a certain kind of success: of winning too much ground too quickly from a much larger opponent, while failing (or even having a plan) to deliver the knockout blow.
To begin with, Germany was a smaller country than the country it proposed to invade – smaller in terms of land area, population, manufacturing capacity, and the material resources available to it. What the Germans had on their side was technological superiority and a revolutionary tactical doctrine. It was the German belief in the technical superiority of their arms that led to the fateful decision to invade the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
In first phase of Barbarossa, the Germans quickly seized huge tracts of Soviet territory, while destroying literally hundreds of Russian formations in the process. The Soviets armies were caught by surprise, and were unable escape encirclement by the fast moving Panzer troops. They were systematically and ruthlessly destroyed. Land that had been Russian land for generations switched hands overnight. At their height, the Germans occupied a Soviet territory many times larger than Germany itself -- a jagged line from Leningrad in the north to Sebastopol in the south.
But there were troubling portent. At the beginning of the conflict, the German Panzers were undoubtedly superior to the Russian tanks. The correct employment of these technically superior tanks laid the foundations for the initial German successes. There were, however, rumors of new Russian models (T34 and KV) that would be more heavily armed and armored than any existing German models. The Germans, peculiarly convinced that the enemy would never emerge from his technological quagmire, were slow to respond with upgunned and more heavily armored models of their own.
Furthermore, the German were stretched across a long front hundreds of miles deep into Soviet territory. The German supply system threatened to buckle under the strain of supplying the Panzer divisions with the fuel, ammo, and material needed to wage war over so extended a territory. Besides for distance, there was the problem of integration. Simply put, the newly conquered territories could not be integrated into the German communications system overnight: it was no simple matter to ship a crate of 88mm ammunition from a factory in Munich to Smolensk in the war zone, as for one thing Russian and German trains ran on tracks of different gauges.
The German attack bogged down, and then in the winter of 1941 the Russians counter- attacked with devastating results. The Russians attacked en masse using their new tanks, and the situation which had existed in the summer of 1941 was now exactly reversed, with the Russians carrying the initiative and the Germans in a state of disorganization and disarray. Prior to the catastrophe, the best of the German battle commanders (Heinz Guderian ) had taken a cold hard look at the situation, and concluded the following:
1) the Germans had started the war by grossly underestimating the enemy’s vastly superior strategic reserves of men and material;
2) the Germans had also underestimated the Soviet capacity to adapt and to evolve, and indeed the Panzer armies had lost their initial technical superiority by not evolving themselves;
3) the Germans were extended over too long a front, which heightened the difficulties posed by points #1 and #2 above, as the Russians could attack with overwhelmingly superior forces at any point along that front with reasonable expectations of success
Guderian advocated limited strategic withdrawals to pre-selected positions chosen for their suitability for defensive warfare: a “shortening of lines,” or narrowing of the Russian offensive front, which at the same time would serve to relieve the strain to Germany’s over-extended systems of supply and command. He recognized that any decision to fight along an extended front served the Russians’ purpose while a shorter front blunted the Russian advantages in men, guns, and tanks. In a nutshell, Guderian argued that Germany would best be served by trading some land for some time, and that that time should be used to develop new weapons with which to continue the offensive under conditions more favorable to Germany.
In the end, though, Guderian was overruled by Hitler, who decided that Germany would not give up an inch of ground, but hold fast and “dig in.” This decision committed Germany to a war of attrition that it could not hope to win, since it meant squandering men and equipment in a fruitless attempt to hold on to exposed salients. The Germans would be slowly bled to death, and while the Russians would also bleed, attritional warfare suited the Russians since they had superior strategic resources with which to survive the bleeding out process.
Now flash forward to 2007: Germany’s situation on the Eastern Front in WWII is indeed uncannily similar to AMD’s situation today. AMD’s failure to correctly assess, and correctly prepare for, the logistical challenges attendant upon a deep and rapid penetration into a rival’s territory is reminiscent of Germany’s lack of strategic vision in preparing for Barbarossa. Hector Ruiz’s decision to hold on to market share at all costs, even at the expense of profitability, echoes the Hitlerian decision to hold onto every inch of captured territory regardless of consequences. And most importantly, AMD’s decision, much like Germany’s decision, to engage the enemy in a war of attrition could not have come at a worse time.
Perhaps there's still time for AMD take a lesson from Colonel General Guderian on the folly of wastefully expending resources in the stubborn attempt to defend territorial gains at any cost; and on the wisdom of coolly and judiciously trading territory for the time needed to retool, reequip, and ultimately resume the struggle against the old ideological adversary.
Sorry, it's a little long....“A lesson from history” – by EasyG
The fortunes of AMD in its struggle against Intel remind me not a little of the great German offensive against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941: a military undertaking codenamed Operation Barbarossa. Leave to one side for a moment the ideological underpinnings of the Russo-German conflict, and what Barbarossa is illustrative of is the danger attendant upon a certain kind of success: of winning too much ground too quickly from a much larger opponent, while failing (or even having a plan) to deliver the knockout blow.
To begin with, Germany was a smaller country than the country it proposed to invade – smaller in terms of land area, population, manufacturing capacity, and the material resources available to it. What the Germans had on their side was technological superiority and a revolutionary tactical doctrine. It was the German belief in the technical superiority of their arms that led to the fateful decision to invade the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
In first phase of Barbarossa, the Germans quickly seized huge tracts of Soviet territory, while destroying literally hundreds of Russian formations in the process. The Soviets armies were caught by surprise, and were unable escape encirclement by the fast moving Panzer troops. They were systematically and ruthlessly destroyed. Land that had been Russian land for generations switched hands overnight. At their height, the Germans occupied a Soviet territory many times larger than Germany itself -- a jagged line from Leningrad in the north to Sebastopol in the south.
But there were troubling portent. At the beginning of the conflict, the German Panzers were undoubtedly superior to the Russian tanks. The correct employment of these technically superior tanks laid the foundations for the initial German successes. There were, however, rumors of new Russian models (T34 and KV) that would be more heavily armed and armored than any existing German models. The Germans, peculiarly convinced that the enemy would never emerge from his technological quagmire, were slow to respond with upgunned and more heavily armored models of their own.
Furthermore, the German were stretched across a long front hundreds of miles deep into Soviet territory. The German supply system threatened to buckle under the strain of supplying the Panzer divisions with the fuel, ammo, and material needed to wage war over so extended a territory. Besides for distance, there was the problem of integration. Simply put, the newly conquered territories could not be integrated into the German communications system overnight: it was no simple matter to ship a crate of 88mm ammunition from a factory in Munich to Smolensk in the war zone, as for one thing Russian and German trains ran on tracks of different gauges.
The German attack bogged down, and then in the winter of 1941 the Russians counter- attacked with devastating results. The Russians attacked en masse using their new tanks, and the situation which had existed in the summer of 1941 was now exactly reversed, with the Russians carrying the initiative and the Germans in a state of disorganization and disarray. Prior to the catastrophe, the best of the German battle commanders (Heinz Guderian ) had taken a cold hard look at the situation, and concluded the following:
1) the Germans had started the war by grossly underestimating the enemy’s vastly superior strategic reserves of men and material;
2) the Germans had also underestimated the Soviet capacity to adapt and to evolve, and indeed the Panzer armies had lost their initial technical superiority by not evolving themselves;
3) the Germans were extended over too long a front, which heightened the difficulties posed by points #1 and #2 above, as the Russians could attack with overwhelmingly superior forces at any point along that front with reasonable expectations of success
Guderian advocated limited strategic withdrawals to pre-selected positions chosen for their suitability for defensive warfare: a “shortening of lines,” or narrowing of the Russian offensive front, which at the same time would serve to relieve the strain to Germany’s over-extended systems of supply and command. He recognized that any decision to fight along an extended front served the Russians’ purpose while a shorter front blunted the Russian advantages in men, guns, and tanks. In a nutshell, Guderian argued that Germany would best be served by trading some land for some time, and that that time should be used to develop new weapons with which to continue the offensive under conditions more favorable to Germany.
In the end, though, Guderian was overruled by Hitler, who decided that Germany would not give up an inch of ground, but hold fast and “dig in.” This decision committed Germany to a war of attrition that it could not hope to win, since it meant squandering men and equipment in a fruitless attempt to hold on to exposed salients. The Germans would be slowly bled to death, and while the Russians would also bleed, attritional warfare suited the Russians since they had superior strategic resources with which to survive the bleeding out process.
Now flash forward to 2007: Germany’s situation on the Eastern Front in WWII is indeed uncannily similar to AMD’s situation today. AMD’s failure to correctly assess, and correctly prepare for, the logistical challenges attendant upon a deep and rapid penetration into a rival’s territory is reminiscent of Germany’s lack of strategic vision in preparing for Barbarossa. Hector Ruiz’s decision to hold on to market share at all costs, even at the expense of profitability, echoes the Hitlerian decision to hold onto every inch of captured territory regardless of consequences. And most importantly, AMD’s decision, much like Germany’s decision, to engage the enemy in a war of attrition could not have come at a worse time.
Perhaps there's still time for AMD take a lesson from Colonel General Guderian on the folly of wastefully expending resources in the stubborn attempt to defend territorial gains at any cost; and on the wisdom of coolly and judiciously trading territory for the time needed to retool, reequip, and ultimately resume the struggle against the old ideological adversary.
I'm guessing EasyG had too much free time, so this piece was written. Still, it is a nice piece of work. I'm afraid "Hector's Reich" will be over sooner than we think.
Facebook
Twitter
Instagram