BiI: AAR & some bugs

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

An embarrassing AAR report from my first game: I lost. <g> I think I must
have been unduly influenced by playing Race to Messina at an impressionable
age, because the first scenario I played was Husky and that's what I did, I
raced to Messina. Then I sat there thinking, gee, the AI's a but lame. Not
much resistance there. Yet all the while I suspect the AI was sitting back
thinking the same about me. I didn't realise till my VPs started to go
through the floor that having ignored Palermo was costing me 100 VP a turn,
which goes to show: never trust that a game designer's going to have the
same ideas about VP that you are. Whoops. Got the guys in trucks and
it became a race to Palermo, but too late, the game ended with a crushing
defeat, despite having surrounded and killed off all of the German units on
the island. Oh well, if there was a campaign (there isn't) the Italian leg
of the job would have been easy!

It's a fun game, but the downside is I've spotted a few bugs. Of these the
first one's a killer:
- the AI replay hangs, I've seen this twice in three games now, both times
when playing as the Axis (turn 5 in Avalanche, first turn in Husky) and it
stops the game dead. Game over, start again. I tried Husky a few times and
each time it hung in the same place, with an Italian battalion surrendering
near Floridia. Makes German Sicily unplayable for me (maybe Axis all up,
we'll see). If nobody noticed this in play testing it might be a video card
thing? (ATI mobility radeon 9600/9700 here, windows update says I've got
the latest drivers).
- some of the inland towns in Sicily have large (up to 4 step) regenerating
militias (I forget what these are called in the game) which don't seem to be
affected by supply & which seem to take hits before other units stacked with
them. Even completely surrounded and subject to repeated turns of 10:1+
attacks, I just couldn't kill these militia steps faster than they
regenerated, which lead to some ahistorical Italian lasts stands. Getting
several lower strength, but still high odds attacks on the same turn works,
but I'm not sure bleeding attacks should be necessary against the home
guard. Attack again Colonel, before they get another chance to recruit!
- the Balkenkreuz symbol doesn't change on some of the Sicilian ports when
they're captured. Messina does work but Catalina & Syracuse don't. This is
a problem aesthetically only I think, AFAIK the VPs are still tallied &
reinforcements definitely arrive.

Not a bug, but a point on the dark map: strongpoints are almost
indistinguishable from the background colour, sometimes I only found them by
wondering why some units wouldn't go in a particular direction. They need
highlighting IMHO.

Regards,
Mike Kreuzer
www.mikekreuzer.com

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

"Mike Kreuzer" <mikekreuzer@SAMEAGAIN.com> a écrit dans le message de news:
42965b3b@dnews.tpgi.com.au...
>
> It's a fun game, but the downside is I've spotted a few bugs. Of these
> the first one's a killer:
> - the AI replay hangs, I've seen this twice in three games now, both times
> when playing as the Axis (turn 5 in Avalanche, first turn in Husky) and it
> stops the game dead. Game over, start again. I tried Husky a few times
> and each time it hung in the same place, with an Italian battalion
> surrendering near Floridia. Makes German Sicily unplayable for me (maybe
> Axis all up, we'll see). If nobody noticed this in play testing it might
> be a video card thing? (ATI mobility radeon 9600/9700 here, windows
> update says I've got the latest drivers).

There's already a patch v1.01 to adress this issue on the Matrix site.
This bug was introduced after the end of the tests and concern computer
Allied AI hang only.
No problem with computer Axis or pbem games.



> Regards,
> Mike Kreuzer
> www.mikekreuzer.com
>

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

"FM" <fm.from-earth@sol3.fr> wrote in
news:42977207$0$11689$8fcfb975@news.wanadoo.fr:

>
> "Mike Kreuzer" <mikekreuzer@SAMEAGAIN.com> a écrit dans le message de
> news: 42965b3b@dnews.tpgi.com.au...
>>
>> It's a fun game, but the downside is I've spotted a few bugs. Of
>> these the first one's a killer:
>> - the AI replay hangs, I've seen this twice in three games now, both
>> times when playing as the Axis (turn 5 in Avalanche, first turn in
>> Husky) and it stops the game dead. Game over, start again. I tried
>> Husky a few times and each time it hung in the same place, with an
>> Italian battalion surrendering near Floridia. Makes German Sicily
>> unplayable for me (maybe Axis all up, we'll see). If nobody noticed
>> this in play testing it might be a video card thing? (ATI mobility
>> radeon 9600/9700 here, windows update says I've got the latest
>> drivers).
>
> There's already a patch v1.01 to adress this issue on the Matrix site.
> This bug was introduced after the end of the tests and concern
> computer Allied AI hang only.
> No problem with computer Axis or pbem games.

Get it at :

ftp://ftp.matrixgames.com/pub/battlesinitaly/BattlesInItaly-
Updatev101.zip

It's under 2 MB, so it will take your modem only an hour or two

Greetz,

Eddy Sterckx


--
"Ceterum censeo Belgicam delendam."
(Cato, 'Pro Gerolphe')

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On 27 May 2005 21:06:59 GMT, Eddy Sterckx <eddysterckx@hotmail.com>
wrote:


>Get it at :
>
>ftp://ftp.matrixgames.com/pub/battlesinitaly/BattlesInItaly-
>Updatev101.zip
>
>It's under 2 MB, so it will take your modem only an hour or two

One thing to mention is that if you are only now buying the game, you
are downloading version 1.01 anyway. No need to bother with the patch.

I'm playing as the Axis in the Husky scenario (just bought the game
today). The attacking AI seems very good, as I expected. It's easy to
get lulled into a sense of ease as the Axis, since there are a lot of
bottlenecks, and you have two or three strong divisions, but the AI,
as usual, is clever at outflanking strong lines.

My first impressions are quite favorable. Husky is one of my favorite
campaigns. Comments on the Matrix forums seem to indicate that the
Allies have to operate very quickly to obtain a victory--wiping out
the HG and 15 Pz don't cut it if you are delayed in taking Messina.

I'm certain there are a few new rules to digest, but I haven't looked
at them yet. The game plays enough like the earlier games that an
experienced play can just step in. There are some tutorial scenarios
included, as in the previous games.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

>> There's already a patch v1.01 to adress this issue on the Matrix site.
>> This bug was introduced after the end of the tests and concern
>> computer Allied AI hang only.
>> No problem with computer Axis or pbem games.
>
> Get it at :
>
> ftp://ftp.matrixgames.com/pub/battlesinitaly/BattlesInItaly-
> Updatev101.zip

Got it, ta.

> It's under 2 MB, so it will take your modem only an hour or two

Now that's just cruel.

Regards,
Mike Kreuzer
www.mikekreuzer.com

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On Fri, 27 May 2005 09:26:41 +1000, "Mike Kreuzer"
<mikekreuzer@SAMEAGAIN.com> wrote:

>An embarrassing AAR report from my first game: I lost. <g> I think I must
>have been unduly influenced by playing Race to Messina at an impressionable
>age, because the first scenario I played was Husky and that's what I did, I
>raced to Messina. Then I sat there thinking, gee, the AI's a but lame. Not
>much resistance there. Yet all the while I suspect the AI was sitting back
>thinking the same about me. I didn't realise till my VPs started to go
>through the floor that having ignored Palermo was costing me 100 VP a turn,
>which goes to show: never trust that a game designer's going to have the
>same ideas about VP that you are. :-


It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
very beginning that Messina was the only key.

This is like Normandy game demanding from US player to occupy Brest in
order to win.


Drax

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> On Fri, 27 May 2005 09:26:41 +1000, "Mike Kreuzer"
> <mikekreuzer@SAMEAGAIN.com> wrote:
>
>
>>An embarrassing AAR report from my first game: I lost. <g> I think I must
>>have been unduly influenced by playing Race to Messina at an impressionable
>>age, because the first scenario I played was Husky and that's what I did, I
>>raced to Messina. Then I sat there thinking, gee, the AI's a but lame. Not
>>much resistance there. Yet all the while I suspect the AI was sitting back
>>thinking the same about me. I didn't realise till my VPs started to go
>>through the floor that having ignored Palermo was costing me 100 VP a turn,
>>which goes to show: never trust that a game designer's going to have the
>>same ideas about VP that you are. :-
>
>
>
> It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
> drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
> very beginning that Messina was the only key.

Huh? You're claiming that outflanking a dug-in defense had "no military
purpose?"

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On Wed, 08 Jun 2005 17:44:05 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
wrote:


>> It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
>> drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
>> very beginning that Messina was the only key.
>
>Huh? You're claiming that outflanking a dug-in defense had "no military
>purpose?"

Patton's drive didn't outflank anyone. It was a wild goose chase that
left Bradley royally pissed off at Patton for years to come.


Drax

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

In article <d61ob11hg1361lntq4o1g93oq8a1n28aqg@4ax.com>,
draxNEVOLIMSPAM@post.t-com.hr says...

> >> It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
> >> drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
> >> very beginning that Messina was the only key.
> >
> >Huh? You're claiming that outflanking a dug-in defense had "no military
> >purpose?"
>
> Patton's drive didn't outflank anyone. It was a wild goose chase that
> left Bradley royally pissed off at Patton for years to come.

<laughter>

Of course, he *did* manage to capture Palermo singlehanded and even
(barely) beat the British to Messina - the only two objectives worth
capturing on the whole island.

If we're looking at things from a Victory Conditions Achieved
standpoint, I'd say Montgomery ended up commanding the "wild goose
chase."

--
Giftzwerg
***
"Let me just put this in fairly simple terms: Al Jazeera now broadcasts
the words of Senator Durbin to the Mideast, certainly putting our troops
in greater danger. No more needs to be said about the motives of
liberals."
- Karl Rove

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> On Wed, 08 Jun 2005 17:44:05 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> wrote:
>
>>>It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
>>>drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
>>>very beginning that Messina was the only key.
>>
>>Huh? You're claiming that outflanking a dug-in defense had "no military
>>purpose?"
>
>
> Patton's drive didn't outflank anyone. It was a wild goose chase that
> left Bradley royally pissed off at Patton for years to come.
>

LOL!

You must have different maps of Sicily than I do. Patton managed to get
to Messina (via Palermo and the north coast road) faster than
Montgomery. It can be argued, that had Patton *not* outflanked the
German defenses, Montgomery *never* would have got to Messina! ;-)

It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation. Pounding head on
over the mountains into the teeth of the German defenses would have been
stupidity itself (which is probably why Bradley favored it), not to
mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

"Briarroot" <woodsyl@iwon.com> wrote in message
news:11bo9l9gjug3kb7@corp.supernews.com...
> Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> > On Wed, 08 Jun 2005 17:44:05 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>>It's odd that the game requires from Allied player to repeat Patton's
> >>>drive which had no military purpose since both sides knew from the
> >>>very beginning that Messina was the only key.
> >>
> >>Huh? You're claiming that outflanking a dug-in defense had "no military
> >>purpose?"
> >
> >
> > Patton's drive didn't outflank anyone. It was a wild goose chase that
> > left Bradley royally pissed off at Patton for years to come.
> >
>
> LOL!
>
> You must have different maps of Sicily than I do. Patton managed to get
> to Messina (via Palermo and the north coast road) faster than
> Montgomery. It can be argued, that had Patton *not* outflanked the
> German defenses, Montgomery *never* would have got to Messina! ;-)
>
> It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
> like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
> them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
> mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
> brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation. Pounding head on
> over the mountains into the teeth of the German defenses would have been
> stupidity itself (which is probably why Bradley favored it), not to
> mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
> Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.



bradley was the least talented high ranking commander we had. if he hadn't
been there nothing changes.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

ray o'hara wrote:
> "Briarroot" <woodsyl@iwon.com> wrote in message
> news:11bo9l9gjug3kb7@corp.supernews.com...
>>
>>It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
>>like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
>>them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
>>mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
>>brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation. Pounding head on
>>over the mountains into the teeth of the German defenses would have been
>>stupidity itself (which is probably why Bradley favored it), not to
>>mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
>>Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.
>
>
> bradley was the least talented high ranking commander we had.

Probably not the *least* talented. He would have made a good Quartermaster.


> if he hadn't been there nothing changes.
>

Oh my god, I actually agree with e.e. o'hara on something! Kill me now!
;-)

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Bradley: George, I'm sorry, but I decided to take the more imaginary
route along the coast and gain the "brilliance" title from folks who are
still a tinkle in their dad's eyes.
Patton: Brad, I command the 7th Army and you command the II Corp within
the 7th Army. YOU'RE FIRED!!!

Bradley was such a mediocre officer that:

a) Marshall supported his promotion from Lt Colonel to Brigadier General
.... skipping the Colonel rank altogether (in Feb 1941).
b) After screwing up the 82nd Infantry Division, Marshall ordered him to
screw up the 28th Infantry Division (in 1942).
c) After requesting to command a Corps several times in 1943, Marshall
refused the requests and eventually assigned him to Eisenhower's staff.
Eisenhower had such a low opinion of his skills, that he assigned
Bradley the job of snitch. His job was to assess the Army's combat
readiness in North Africa and provide recommendations for corrective
measures.
d) Deciding that he had enough of Bradley's incompetence, Eisenhower
demoted him to II Corps deputy commanding general under Patton.
e) Later, when Patton was tapped to plan the Sicily invasion and given
the command of the 7th Army, Eisenhower chose to humiliate Bradley by
assigning him the job of II Corps Commanding General, assuming Patton's
old job.

I won't bore folks with more examples of his failures as a military
officer after Sicily. They are just too enormous.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/bradley/bradley.htm


Briarroot wrote:
> ray o'hara wrote:
>
>>"Briarroot" <woodsyl@iwon.com> wrote in message
>>news:11bo9l9gjug3kb7@corp.supernews.com...
>>
>>>It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
>>>like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
>>>them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
>>>mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
>>>brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation. Pounding head on
>>>over the mountains into the teeth of the German defenses would have been
>>>stupidity itself (which is probably why Bradley favored it), not to
>>>mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
>>>Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.
>>
>>
>> bradley was the least talented high ranking commander we had.
>
>
> Probably not the *least* talented. He would have made a good Quartermaster.
>
>
>
>> if he hadn't been there nothing changes.
>>
>
>
> Oh my god, I actually agree with e.e. o'hara on something! Kill me now!
> ;-)

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Gary Heverly wrote:
> Bradley: George, I'm sorry, but I decided to take the more imaginary
> route along the coast and gain the "brilliance" title from folks who are
> still a tinkle in their dad's eyes.
> Patton: Brad, I command the 7th Army and you command the II Corp within
> the 7th Army. YOU'RE FIRED!!!
>
> Bradley was such a mediocre officer that:
>
> a) Marshall supported his promotion from Lt Colonel to Brigadier General
> ... skipping the Colonel rank altogether (in Feb 1941).

And we all know that Marshall was never wrong, don't we? It *wasn't*
Marshall that thought it would have been possible to invade France in
1942 or '43, was it?


> b) After screwing up the 82nd Infantry Division, Marshall ordered him to
> screw up the 28th Infantry Division (in 1942).

Hmm, why the lateral move and not a promotion?


> c) After requesting to command a Corps several times in 1943, Marshall
> refused the requests and eventually assigned him to Eisenhower's staff.
> Eisenhower had such a low opinion of his skills, that he assigned
> Bradley the job of snitch. His job was to assess the Army's combat
> readiness in North Africa and provide recommendations for corrective
> measures.

Are you saying that Marshall thought that Bradley was incompetent to
command a division in combat, and so he assigned him to a staff job?
Tsk, tsk!


> d) Deciding that he had enough of Bradley's incompetence, Eisenhower
> demoted him to II Corps deputy commanding general under Patton.

So Ike didn't want him around either?


> e) Later, when Patton was tapped to plan the Sicily invasion and given
> the command of the 7th Army, Eisenhower chose to humiliate Bradley by
> assigning him the job of II Corps Commanding General, assuming Patton's
> old job.

Wasn't it Georgie that asked for his old pal Brad to take over 2nd
Corps? Bradley was a loyal subordinate who could be counted on to
follow Patton's orders - like a good Quartermaster should. ;-)

>
> I won't bore folks with more examples of his failures as a military
> officer after Sicily. They are just too enormous.

Quartermasters are military officers too, you know! ;-)

You left out the part where Bradley is given command of all US forces
for Operation Overlord instead of Patton because of the "slapping
incident." You also left out the part where Bradley is later given an
entire Army Group under whose command fell Patton's brand new 3rd Army.
You likewise left out the part where Patton's 3rd Army then runs wild,
attacking in 5 different directions simultaneously, much to Bradley's
dismay. You see, Bradley being a such a good general, wanted to follow
Eisenhower's orders to the letter and send the entire 3rd Army to the
west through Brittany; but Patton, being such a poor sport and a rotten
subordinate, ignored Bradley & Eisenhower and proceeded to attack
eastward anyway (& south & southwest & southeast & northeast!), sending
just a token force toward the useless Brittany ports. Damn, if it
hadn't been for silly old Georgie Patton, the Allies might not have had
that messy situation with the Falaise pocket to clear up. They could
have just relaxed and gone fishing from the piers at Brest instead.
Yep, Bradley would have made a *good* Quartermaster! ;-)

>
> http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/bradley/bradley.htm

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On Sun, 26 Jun 2005 13:19:13 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
wrote:


>And we all know that Marshall was never wrong, don't we? It *wasn't*
>Marshall that thought it would have been possible to invade France in
>1942 or '43, was it?

Since it hasn't been atempted, we'd never know for sure, but the fact
that Marshall went along with British refusal means that he was open
to valid military arguments against the 1943 invasion of France.

>You likewise left out the part where Patton's 3rd Army then runs wild,
>attacking in 5 different directions simultaneously, much to Bradley's
>dismay.

Would you expand on this a bit, especially the "dismay" part?

>You see, Bradley being a such a good general, wanted to follow
>Eisenhower's orders to the letter and send the entire 3rd Army to the
>west through Brittany; but Patton, being such a poor sport and a rotten
>subordinate, ignored Bradley & Eisenhower and proceeded to attack
>eastward anyway

Try again. Patton sent most of his force including his only two
armoured divisions to the west, towards Brest. It was division
commanders who signaled Patton that they are "winning the war in the
wrong direction". Patton knew he was on sort of probation, so he
followed orders.


However, I do hold Patton as the best army commander US Army had and a
better choice for army group command than Bradley.


Drax

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On Fri, 24 Jun 2005 11:26:47 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
wrote:


>You must have different maps of Sicily than I do. Patton managed to get
>to Messina (via Palermo and the north coast road) faster than
>Montgomery.

The capture of Palermo had nothing to do with the capture of Messina.
There was never a race to the city (except in Patton's mind) and drive
to Palermo was nothing but publicity affair. Germans were in the east
and centre, Patton took his provisional corps to the west.

>It can be argued, that had Patton *not* outflanked the German defenses,
>Montgomery *never* would have got to Messina! ;-)

Only to people who take the film "Patton" as the last word in the
history of the Sicily campaign.


>It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
>like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
>them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
>mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
>brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation.

There was no end run to Messina. Sicily was cut in half by Bradley's
45th division while Patton was still in Palermo. The final offensive
against Messina was concentrated effort of both armies against the
unified German front.

>Pounding head on over the mountains into the teeth of the German
>defenses would have been stupidity itself (which is probably why
>Bradley favored it),

No. The problem was that Patton took three divisions on the ride to
the west leaving Bradley with two to take on the Germans. Had Patton
use his troops to attack the flank of Germans facing Bradley, that
would be a different thing.

>not to mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
>Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.

That's correct. I wonder whether this fact had anything to do with the
reasons why Patton went there.


Drax

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> On Sun, 26 Jun 2005 13:19:13 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>>And we all know that Marshall was never wrong, don't we? It *wasn't*
>>Marshall that thought it would have been possible to invade France in
>>1942 or '43, was it?
>
>
> Since it hasn't been atempted, we'd never know for sure, but the fact
> that Marshall went along with British refusal means that he was open
> to valid military arguments against the 1943 invasion of France.

Marshall *had* to go along with the British since without Britain to use
as a base of operations, there wouldn't have been *any* invasion at all.
Marshall argued strenuously for 1942. When he was thwarted, he then
argued strenuously for 1943. Hell, Marshall wanted Jimmy Doolittle
(from the Air Corps) to command the invasion of Morocco in Operation
Torch! It was Eisenhower who insisted on Patton. The point is that
Marshall certainly wasn't perfect (surprise!), so using his decision to
promote Bradley is hardly evidence of Bradley's merit. And I never said
Bradley was a *bad* general, just that he was a mediocre general. But
then compared to Patton, so was most of the US Army.


>>You likewise left out the part where Patton's 3rd Army then runs wild,
>>attacking in 5 different directions simultaneously, much to Bradley's
>>dismay.
>
>
> Would you expand on this a bit, especially the "dismay" part?

Oh, come on. Can't I have a little fun from time to time? ;-)


>>You see, Bradley being a such a good general, wanted to follow
>>Eisenhower's orders to the letter and send the entire 3rd Army to the
>>west through Brittany; but Patton, being such a poor sport and a rotten
>>subordinate, ignored Bradley & Eisenhower and proceeded to attack
>>eastward anyway
>
>
> Try again. Patton sent most of his force including his only two
> armoured divisions to the west, towards Brest. It was division
> commanders who signaled Patton that they are "winning the war in the
> wrong direction". Patton knew he was on sort of probation, so he
> followed orders.

Sorry, but I don't think that is correct. Patton did not follow
Bradley's orders with respect to Brittany, but managed to persuade
Bradley to bow to the inevitable. Bradley was worried about his flanks,
Patton was more concerned about making the Germans worry about *their*
flanks.


> However, I do hold Patton as the best army commander US Army had and a
> better choice for army group command than Bradley.
>

Which is all I was saying in the first place. I don't knock Bradley for
being Bradley, I knock him for his (later) criticisms of Patton after
Patton was no longer around to defend his reputation.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> On Fri, 24 Jun 2005 11:26:47 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>>You must have different maps of Sicily than I do. Patton managed to get
>>to Messina (via Palermo and the north coast road) faster than
>>Montgomery.
>
>
> The capture of Palermo had nothing to do with the capture of Messina.
> There was never a race to the city (except in Patton's mind) and drive
> to Palermo was nothing but publicity affair. Germans were in the east
> and centre, Patton took his provisional corps to the west.

That's an absolutely ridiculous statement. The capture of Palermo, and
Patton's use of the road running east from there along the coast to
Messina, were the primary reason the campaign ended so quickly. The
Germans had to keep pulling back their right flank because of Patton's
drive. They had not been able to finish fortifying this portion of the
'Etna Line' and Patton never gave them the time to do so, using
amphibious outflanking maneuvers when faced with stubborn opposition.
Patton, a cavalryman, understood the power of flanking movements in
overcoming static defenses, as apparently no one else on the island
(except the Germans!) did.


>>It can be argued, that had Patton *not* outflanked the German defenses,
>>Montgomery *never* would have got to Messina! ;-)
>
>
> Only to people who take the film "Patton" as the last word in the
> history of the Sicily campaign.

I haven't seen the film in many years but from what I recall of it, it
seems that it is *you* who are basing your quite erroneous statements on
the film, not me. <shrug>


>>It's unsurprising to me that Bradley did not like Patton. Mediocrities
>>like Bradley are forever outshined by talents like Patton and it galls
>>them no end. I'm not going to claim that Patton never made any
>>mistakes, but in my opinion, his end run to Messina was not only
>>brilliant, but entirely justified by the situation.
>
>
> There was no end run to Messina. Sicily was cut in half by Bradley's
> 45th division while Patton was still in Palermo. The final offensive
> against Messina was concentrated effort of both armies against the
> unified German front.

Compared to 7th Army's *original* orders, Patton's drive *was* an
end-around. His original orders had been to simply move north over the
mountains in conformance with 8th Army's movements, protecting their
western flank. But after being ordered to give up Route 124, Patton
flew to Alexander's HQ (still in Tunisia) to insist that the the 7th
Army be allowed to drive north and split the island in two. Alexander
reluctantly gave his permission as long as Patton's forces could still
hold a key road junction near Caltanissetta. The 45th Division may have
been the one that actually cut the coast road, but it was entirely
Patton's plan, not Bradley's. Note, Patton never told Alexander that he
was going to Palermo, nor that he intended to attack eastwards as fast
as he could muster his forces. In fact, he promised Alexander that he
would faithfully guard Montgomery's flank, though he never had any
intention of doing anything of the sort. I think Patton termed it like
this: 'it never hurts to promise!' ;-)


>>Pounding head on over the mountains into the teeth of the German
>>defenses would have been stupidity itself (which is probably why
>>Bradley favored it),
>
>
> No. The problem was that Patton took three divisions on the ride to
> the west leaving Bradley with two to take on the Germans. Had Patton
> use his troops to attack the flank of Germans facing Bradley, that
> would be a different thing.

What the heck are you talking about? Bradley was a Corps commander
*under* Patton, and Patton's attack east along the coast road *was*
attacking into the flank of the German divisions facing Bradley's Corps.


>>not to mention the fact that Palermo was an infinitely superior port than was
>>Gela, where all 7th Army supplies had to be dragged ashore.
>
>
> That's correct. I wonder whether this fact had anything to do with the
> reasons why Patton went there.

I wonder why you wonder.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

In article <11c5hqs70qskrb3@corp.supernews.com>, woodsyl@iwon.com
says...

> Note, Patton never told Alexander that he
> was going to Palermo, nor that he intended to attack eastwards as fast
> as he could muster his forces. In fact, he promised Alexander that he
> would faithfully guard Montgomery's flank, though he never had any
> intention of doing anything of the sort.

It strikes me that Patton's offensive eastwards and northwards was the
*best* way to "guard Montgomery's flank."

--
Giftzwerg
***
"[Natan] Sharansky spent nine years in the Gulag - the real one - and
over 400 of those days were in punishment cells. What he had to suffer
was almost inconceivably depraved. To read Sharansky, while Amnesty
International is squawking about Guantanamo, is enough to make you hate
Amnesty for the rest of your life."
- Jay Nordlinger

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

On Wed, 29 Jun 2005 12:06:00 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
wrote:


>That's an absolutely ridiculous statement. The capture of Palermo, and
>Patton's use of the road running east from there along the coast to
>Messina, were the primary reason the campaign ended so quickly.

Says you. There was nothing "quick" in the campaign and Germans never
really intended to stay on Sicily indefinitely once Italians start to
waver.

>The Germans had to keep pulling back their right flank because of Patton's
>drive. They had not been able to finish fortifying this portion of the
>'Etna Line' and Patton never gave them the time to do so, using
>amphibious outflanking maneuvers when faced with stubborn opposition.

These amphibious maneuvers accomplished nothing. Time and again,
Patton had to urge the main force to extra effort to relieve the guys
stranded on the beach.


>I haven't seen the film in many years but from what I recall of it, it
>seems that it is *you* who are basing your quite erroneous statements on
>the film, not me. <shrug>

No, my principal source for this debate is D'Este's biography of
Patton.


>Compared to 7th Army's *original* orders, Patton's drive *was* an
>end-around. His original orders had been to simply move north over the
>mountains in conformance with 8th Army's movements, protecting their
>western flank. But after being ordered to give up Route 124, Patton
>flew to Alexander's HQ (still in Tunisia) to insist that the the 7th
>Army be allowed to drive north and split the island in two. Alexander
>reluctantly gave his permission as long as Patton's forces could still
>hold a key road junction near Caltanissetta. The 45th Division may have
>been the one that actually cut the coast road, but it was entirely
>Patton's plan, not Bradley's. Note, Patton never told Alexander that he
>was going to Palermo, nor that he intended to attack eastwards as fast
>as he could muster his forces. In fact, he promised Alexander that he
>would faithfully guard Montgomery's flank, though he never had any
>intention of doing anything of the sort. I think Patton termed it like
>this: 'it never hurts to promise!' ;-)

Yes, everything you wrote above stands. The point is that Patton took
three divisions from the main battle to bag a lot of worthless real
estate and bunch of Italians willing to surrender to the first Allied
troops.


>What the heck are you talking about? Bradley was a Corps commander
>*under* Patton,

Yes, and Patton left Bradley on his own.

>and Patton's attack east along the coast road *was* attacking into the flank
>of the German divisions facing Bradley's Corps.

Bradley reached the coast road while Patton was still in Palermo.
Bradley was fighting Germans, while Patton was bagging Italian
militia.

If you can find me an account of Patton engaging any German division
during his ride to Palermo, I'll gladly concede the point, but as far
as I know, by the time Patton left Palermo, Bradley was already on the
coast and was facing Germans.


Drax

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

Drazen Kramaric wrote:
> On Wed, 29 Jun 2005 12:06:00 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> wrote:
>
>>I haven't seen the film in many years but from what I recall of it, it
>>seems that it is *you* who are basing your quite erroneous statements on
>>the film, not me. <shrug>
>
> No, my principal source for this debate is D'Este's biography of
> Patton.

How interesting. I too, own a copy of that book, as well as D'Este's
history of the Sicily campaign entitled: "Bitter Victory, The Battle for
Sicily, 1943." Here's what D'Este had to say:

"The capture of Palermo by Seventh Army marked a clear turning point in
the battle for Sicily." (Carlo D'Este, "Bitter Victory," Dutton, New
York, 1988, pg 443)

He also says:

"In contrast to Eighth Army, Seventh Army was not only fully mobile but
its commander was eager to take advantage of that mobility in a daring
and spectacular manner. By the end of the campaign, Patton's use of
armour in terrain wholly unsuitable for tank warfare had left Montgomery
envious and unable to forget that he had saddled himself in the desert
with a Corps de Chasse that wouldn't chasse." (D'Este "Bitter Victory"
pg 558)

Which sort of knocks the props out from under your comments about
Patton. ;-)


>>That's an absolutely ridiculous statement. The capture of Palermo, and
>>Patton's use of the road running east from there along the coast to
>>Messina, were the primary reason the campaign ended so quickly.
>
>
> Says you. There was nothing "quick" in the campaign and Germans never
> really intended to stay on Sicily indefinitely once Italians start to
> waver.

Not quick? Perhaps not as quick as it could have been, but you can't
blame Patton for that; after all it was Montgomery and Alexander who
were responsible for the overall strategy. One thing is clear (at least
to me), and that is that Patton's drive was the key to ending the
campaign. It took 38 only days to conquer Sicily, with fighting over
mountainous terrain similar to what the Allies would face fighting on
the Italian mainland, where the it took them almost a year to capture
the territory between Salerno and Rome, an area scarcely larger than
Sicily. The Germans may not have intended to stay on Sicily, but they
did manage to reinforce their troops on the island and they obviously
intended to make the Allies pay dearly for every foot of ground. My
contention is that the campaign would have been still longer had it not
been for Patton and his move along the north coast road.


>>The Germans had to keep pulling back their right flank because of Patton's
>>drive. They had not been able to finish fortifying this portion of the
>>'Etna Line' and Patton never gave them the time to do so, using
>>amphibious outflanking maneuvers when faced with stubborn opposition.
>
>
> These amphibious maneuvers accomplished nothing. Time and again,
> Patton had to urge the main force to extra effort to relieve the guys
> stranded on the beach.

Your man, D'Este, disagrees with that viewpoint!

"Patton's use of amphibious 'end-runs' was the right idea and would have
been far more successful if employed on a larger scale. Despite the
objections of Bradley and Truscott, Patton was correct to pursue this
tactic rather than continue the slow and costly advance against stubborn
German delaying actions." (D'Este "Bitter Victory" pg 559)


>>Compared to 7th Army's *original* orders, Patton's drive *was* an
>>end-around. His original orders had been to simply move north over the
>>mountains in conformance with 8th Army's movements, protecting their
>>western flank. But after being ordered to give up Route 124, Patton
>>flew to Alexander's HQ (still in Tunisia) to insist that the the 7th
>>Army be allowed to drive north and split the island in two. Alexander
>>reluctantly gave his permission as long as Patton's forces could still
>>hold a key road junction near Caltanissetta. The 45th Division may have
>>been the one that actually cut the coast road, but it was entirely
>>Patton's plan, not Bradley's. Note, Patton never told Alexander that he
>>was going to Palermo, nor that he intended to attack eastwards as fast
>>as he could muster his forces. In fact, he promised Alexander that he
>>would faithfully guard Montgomery's flank, though he never had any
>>intention of doing anything of the sort. I think Patton termed it like
>>this: 'it never hurts to promise!' ;-)
>
>
> Yes, everything you wrote above stands. The point is that Patton took
> three divisions from the main battle to bag a lot of worthless real
> estate and bunch of Italians willing to surrender to the first Allied
> troops.

Only 2 Divisions; and Bradley still his original two divisions, the 1st
and 45th Infantry Divisions. Patton formed a new Corps (the Provisional
Corps) and sent the 2nd Armored Division and the 3rd Infantry Division
to Palermo. And you seem to be under the impression that Patton
*himself* led the move to Palermo. It was General Truscott (CO of 3rd
ID) who led the Provisional Corps into Palermo.


>>What the heck are you talking about? Bradley was a Corps commander
>>*under* Patton,
>
>
> Yes, and Patton left Bradley on his own.

I don't understand you. Bradley still had II Corps, he was still
following Patton's orders and everything Bradley did *was* Patton's
work. Nobody left anybody on their own.


>>and Patton's attack east along the coast road *was* attacking into the flank
>>of the German divisions facing Bradley's Corps.
>
>
> Bradley reached the coast road while Patton was still in Palermo.
> Bradley was fighting Germans, while Patton was bagging Italian
> militia.
>
> If you can find me an account of Patton engaging any German division
> during his ride to Palermo, I'll gladly concede the point, but as far
> as I know, by the time Patton left Palermo, Bradley was already on the
> coast and was facing Germans.

Sheesh! Patton didn't *go* to Palermo, he sent Truscott! Everything
for which you have tried to claim credit for Bradley should actually be
placed on the list of *Patton's* accomplishments. If you're going to be
that illogical, you might just as well say that 'Patton cut the coast
road while Truscott was joyriding to Palermo,' or some other such
nonsense. It was Patton who sent Bradley north to cut the road.
Bradley was just following Patton's orders, as was Truscott. How much
clearer can I make it?

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

"Drazen Kramaric" <draxNEVOLIMSPAM@post.t-com.hr> wrote in message
news:qre4c1dpn1rqi6qmscmahe83comtacvu01@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 26 Jun 2005 13:19:13 -0400, Briarroot <woodsyl@iwon.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> >And we all know that Marshall was never wrong, don't we? It *wasn't*
> >Marshall that thought it would have been possible to invade France in
> >1942 or '43, was it?
>
> Since it hasn't been atempted, we'd never know for sure, but the fact
> that Marshall went along with British refusal means that he was open
> to valid military arguments against the 1943 invasion of France.
>
> >You likewise left out the part where Patton's 3rd Army then runs wild,
> >attacking in 5 different directions simultaneously, much to Bradley's
> >dismay.
>
> Would you expand on this a bit, especially the "dismay" part?
>
> >You see, Bradley being a such a good general, wanted to follow
> >Eisenhower's orders to the letter and send the entire 3rd Army to the
> >west through Brittany; but Patton, being such a poor sport and a rotten
> >subordinate, ignored Bradley & Eisenhower and proceeded to attack
> >eastward anyway
>
> Try again. Patton sent most of his force including his only two
> armoured divisions to the west, towards Brest. It was division
> commanders who signaled Patton that they are "winning the war in the
> wrong direction". Patton knew he was on sort of probation, so he
> followed orders.
>
>
> However, I do hold Patton as the best army commander US Army had and a
> better choice for army group command than Bradley.
>
>
> Drax


bill simpson and al patch and l.k.truscott were as good as patton and much
less likely to get in trouble both on and off the battlefield.

 

[Guest]

Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (More info?)

"Briarroot" <>
> Sheesh! Patton didn't *go* to Palermo, he sent Truscott! Everything
> for which you have tried to claim credit for Bradley should actually be
> placed on the list of *Patton's* accomplishments. If you're going to be
> that illogical, you might just as well say that 'Patton cut the coast
> road while Truscott was joyriding to Palermo,' or some other such
> nonsense. It was Patton who sent Bradley north to cut the road.
> Bradley was just following Patton's orders, as was Truscott. How much
> clearer can I make it?

you are debating a man who thinks hood's invasion of tennessee in 1864 was
a brilliantly conceived plan.