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Validity of audio tests - Page 5

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Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 20, 2005 4:49:30 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 19 Jul 2005 00:48:16 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:

>Many of these questions have been dicussed before. Using an ABX is NOT
>equivalent to DBT as is used in drug testing.
>
>The ABX machine itself is a limitation, especially if interconnect is
>neing evaluated. How good are the contacts? How good is the internal
>mating?

ABX is a test protocol, not a machine.

>The problem in any audio evaluation is that we MUST rely on audio
>memory. True DBT (such as drug DBT) has no such limitation. It is
>IMPOSSIBLE to listen simultaneously to two different components. One is
>always listening to one or the other, while holding in one's memory the
>sound of the other.

Yes, which is why quick-switched ABX via a switch-box is the most
effective method. Compare and contrast with *any* other audio
comparison.

>I have heard differences between various interconnects.

Yeah, riiiigghht.........

> I performed
>medium-term listening in the dark, so that my sense of hearing could
>hone in on the matter at hand. Evaluative listening undertaken with the
>lights on is not as precise, beacause the brain is occupied with
>vision, which is very demanding on the brain. 'Going dark' is VERY
>revealing. Those who SWEAR they cannot hear differences in cables
>should try it!

Sitting in the dark is also very good for enhancing the imagination.

--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 20, 2005 4:49:52 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

"Harry Lavo" <hlavo@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:D bhi8301ehj@news2.newsguy.com...
> <normanstrong@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:D behtj01h1s@news3.newsguy.com...
>> "Harry Lavo" <hlavo@comcast.net> wrote in message
>> news:D bdt1f0os3@news3.newsguy.com...
>>> <nabob33@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>>> news:D bb7bg011bl@news3.newsguy.com...
>>>
>>>
>>>> Yes, it does sound like you have bought into Harry's anti-scientific
>>>> worldview. I suggest you endeavor to talk to a real scientist for a
>>>> change.
>>>
>>> Nothing I have said in this or any other group is "unscientific". It
>>> does
>>> not support ABX without questioning some of the basic premises. That
>>> simple.
>>>
>>> If you are truly a scientist, you think about these things objectively,
>>> at
>>> least. If you have become dogmatic and accept it as an article of
>>> faith,
>>> then questioning it becomes tauntamont to heresy.
>>>
>>> I leave readers to decide which is operational here.
>>
>> I'm forever interested in how those of Harry's persuasion would go about
>> determining if there is an audible difference between 2 devices. The
>> question is always the same. Can you hear a difference between 2
>> presentations? You can listen as long as you wish; you can ask other
>> opinions; you can switch between them slowly or quickly; you can take
>> notes;
>> you can change the source material, etc., etc. The only things you
>> cannot
>> do is peek or make measurements. IOW, you have to make your choices on
>> the
>> basis of what you hear.
>>
>> To my way of thinking, ABX seems to be one of the more sensitive methods
>> of
>> making such a determination. But if you don't, suggest something else.
>> I'm
>> certainly open to suggestions.
>>
>> One last point: DBT seems to be the gold standard for evaluating most
>> everything else. Why should high fidelity audio be an exception?
>>
>
> Norman, I've explained in detail here and on other forums exactly how a
> blind, monadic test would be used to detect and define (statistically) a
> difference, if it existed. Then ABX could be tested to see if it revealed
> those differences.

I know you have, Harry, but yours truly has either misplaced your
description or misunderstood it. In any event, I no longer have it. Could
you supply a link for me with a concise description? Then I won't bother
you about it again--I promise!

Thanks,

Norm
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 21, 2005 4:01:54 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

"Jenn" <jennconducts@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:D bk6tg0406@news2.newsguy.com...
> In article <dbhikg01f10@news2.newsguy.com>, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com
> wrote:
>
>> Many of these questions have been dicussed before. Using an ABX is NOT
>> equivalent to DBT as is used in drug testing.
>>
>> The ABX machine itself is a limitation, especially if interconnect is
>> neing evaluated. How good are the contacts? How good is the internal
>> mating?
>>
>> The problem in any audio evaluation is that we MUST rely on audio
>> memory. True DBT (such as drug DBT) has no such limitation. It is
>> IMPOSSIBLE to listen simultaneously to two different components. One is
>> always listening to one or the other, while holding in one's memory the
>> sound of the other.
>>
>> I have heard differences between various interconnects. I performed
>> medium-term listening in the dark, so that my sense of hearing could
>> hone in on the matter at hand. Evaluative listening undertaken with the
>> lights on is not as precise, beacause the brain is occupied with
>> vision, which is very demanding on the brain. 'Going dark' is VERY
>> revealing. Those who SWEAR they cannot hear differences in cables
>> should try it!
>
> Interesting. I wonder if this relates to why many performers do their
> work with their eyes closed, as do I at times. Notable examples are
> HVK, Ma ............

It's why I usually listen with my eyes closed at concerts. I can
concentrate both on the music and the live sound quality better than with
them open.

Of course, at my age I have to be careful not to snore.... :-)
Related resources
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 21, 2005 4:16:14 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are ther to be
heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
I would argue that it is difficult, and that not everyone has the skill
to do it. One has to learn to listen for the various kinds of
differences that audio cables have, and one first must have a lot of
recordings with different kinds of sounds on them. I find brushed
cymbals provide a very nice sound for comparative listening. Such a
recording as:

Paul Motian Trio: Le Voyage

is excellent.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000024CHH/qid...

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000024CH...

The ability or inability of the cable to pass transients well is
clearly revealed in such a recording. Continuous tones, such as voices,
are not as good to listen to.

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 19 Jul 2005 00:48:16 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>
> >Many of these questions have been dicussed before. Using an ABX is NOT
> >equivalent to DBT as is used in drug testing.
> >
> >The ABX machine itself is a limitation, especially if interconnect is
> >neing evaluated. How good are the contacts? How good is the internal
> >mating?
>
> ABX is a test protocol, not a machine.
>
> >The problem in any audio evaluation is that we MUST rely on audio
> >memory. True DBT (such as drug DBT) has no such limitation. It is
> >IMPOSSIBLE to listen simultaneously to two different components. One is
> >always listening to one or the other, while holding in one's memory the
> >sound of the other.
>
> Yes, which is why quick-switched ABX via a switch-box is the most
> effective method. Compare and contrast with *any* other audio
> comparison.
>
> >I have heard differences between various interconnects.
>
> Yeah, riiiigghht.........
>
> > I performed
> >medium-term listening in the dark, so that my sense of hearing could
> >hone in on the matter at hand. Evaluative listening undertaken with the
> >lights on is not as precise, beacause the brain is occupied with
> >vision, which is very demanding on the brain. 'Going dark' is VERY
> >revealing. Those who SWEAR they cannot hear differences in cables
> >should try it!
>
> Sitting in the dark is also very good for enhancing the imagination.
>
> --
>
> Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 22, 2005 4:55:29 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:

>I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
>scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are ther to be
>heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
>two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.

The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.

>I would argue that it is difficult, and that not everyone has the skill
>to do it. One has to learn to listen for the various kinds of
>differences that audio cables have, and one first must have a lot of
>recordings with different kinds of sounds on them.

Not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an ability
to hear 'cable sound', when they did not *know* which cable was
connected. Why do you think there's been a pool of about $5,000 lying
on the table for six *years*, with no takers?

> I find brushed
>cymbals provide a very nice sound for comparative listening. Such a
>recording as:
>
>Paul Motian Trio: Le Voyage
>
>is excellent.
>
>http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000024CHH/qid...
>
>http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000024CH...
>
>The ability or inability of the cable to pass transients well is
>clearly revealed in such a recording. Continuous tones, such as voices,
>are not as good to listen to.

Utter rubbish. Are you prepared to step up to the plate and try your
luck, or is this more baseless assertion?
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 23, 2005 3:48:32 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>
> >I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
> >scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are there to be
> >heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
> >two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
>
> The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.

No, it certainly is not. To say so is to take a dogmatic position. To
say "there are no differences to be heard" is a dogmatic assertion. If
you were to say "I am not convinced there are any differences to be
heard", you would have an argument. One cannot prove a negative.

> >I would argue that it is difficult, and that not everyone has the skill
> >to do it. One has to learn to listen for the various kinds of
> >differences that audio cables have, and one first must have a lot of
> >recordings with different kinds of sounds on them.
>
> Not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an ability
> to hear 'cable sound', when they did not *know* which cable was
> connected. Why do you think there's been a pool of about $5,000 lying
> on the table for six *years*, with no takers?
>
> > I find brushed
> >cymbals provide a very nice sound for comparative listening. Such a
> >recording as:
> >
> >Paul Motian Trio: Le Voyage
> >
> >is excellent.
> >
> >http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000024CHH/qid...
> >
> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000024CH...
> >
> >The ability or inability of the cable to pass transients well is
> >clearly revealed in such a recording. Continuous tones, such as voices,
> >are not as good to listen to.
>
> Utter rubbish. Are you prepared to step up to the plate and try your
> luck, or is this more baseless assertion?

Why don't you try it yourself, and quite being a dogmatist? I have no
interest in meeting the requirements that you have set out. I
amskeptical about ABX.


> --
>
> Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 23, 2005 9:10:46 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 22 Jul 2005 23:48:32 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:

>Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
>> On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>>
>> >I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
>> >scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are there to be
>> >heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
>> >two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
>>
>> The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.
>
>No, it certainly is not. To say so is to take a dogmatic position.

Nope, it is an opinion based on much testing. To say that there *are*
audible differences, in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
evidence that this is the case, is indeed dogmatic, a true act of
blind faith.

>To
>say "there are no differences to be heard" is a dogmatic assertion. If
>you were to say "I am not convinced there are any differences to be
>heard", you would have an argument. One cannot prove a negative.

One can however have a very good idea where to place your bet, given
that not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an
ability to hear 'cable sound'.

I therefore assert, with considerable confidence, that it is a fact
that there are no differences to be heard.

>> >I would argue that it is difficult, and that not everyone has the skill
>> >to do it. One has to learn to listen for the various kinds of
>> >differences that audio cables have, and one first must have a lot of
>> >recordings with different kinds of sounds on them.
>>
>> Not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an ability
>> to hear 'cable sound', when they did not *know* which cable was
>> connected. Why do you think there's been a pool of about $5,000 lying
>> on the table for six *years*, with no takers?
>>
>> > I find brushed
>> >cymbals provide a very nice sound for comparative listening. Such a
>> >recording as:
>> >
>> >Paul Motian Trio: Le Voyage
>> >
>> >is excellent.
>> >
>> >http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000024CHH/qid...
>> >
>> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000024CH...
>> >
>> >The ability or inability of the cable to pass transients well is
>> >clearly revealed in such a recording. Continuous tones, such as voices,
>> >are not as good to listen to.
>>
>> Utter rubbish. Are you prepared to step up to the plate and try your
>> luck, or is this more baseless assertion?
>
>Why don't you try it yourself, and quite being a dogmatist? I have no
>interest in meeting the requirements that you have set out. I
>amskeptical about ABX.

I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
detailed recording of two great drummers.
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 23, 2005 10:11:58 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 23 Jul 2005 17:10:46 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
wrote (among other things):

>I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
>typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
>for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
>record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
>detailed recording of two great drummers.

Looks to me like the statement "two great drummers" is an
opinion. Not in my experience, there have been hundreds of better
drummers make the scene over the past 80 years.


-=Bill Eckle=-
abuse@wmeckle.com
Vanity Web Page at:
http://www.wmeckle.com
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 2:00:30 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 22 Jul 2005 23:48:32 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>
> >Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> >> On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
> >>
> >> >I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
> >> >scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are there to be
> >> >heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
> >> >two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
> >>
> >> The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.
> >
> >No, it certainly is not. To say so is to take a dogmatic position.
>
> Nope, it is an opinion based on much testing.


"Much testing?"



> To say that there *are*
> audible differences, in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
> evidence that this is the case, is indeed dogmatic, a true act of
> blind faith.


To say the opposite in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
evidence is every bit as dogmatic and every bit true act of blind
faith. There have ben numerous acounts of claims of difference under
blind conditions. What you are really doing is simply picking and
choosing your anecdotal evidence. One can draw any conclusion they wish
to draw with this MO.




>
> >To
> >say "there are no differences to be heard" is a dogmatic assertion. If
> >you were to say "I am not convinced there are any differences to be
> >heard", you would have an argument. One cannot prove a negative.
>
> One can however have a very good idea where to place your bet,



Of couse, always bet on the house. only a fool sets up a bet that will
be a loser.



> given
> that not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an
> ability to hear 'cable sound'.



Or visa versa....




>
> I therefore assert, with considerable confidence, that it is a fact
> that there are no differences to be heard.


I assert with considerable confidence that assertions made with
considerable confidence are a dime a dozen.





>
> >> >I would argue that it is difficult, and that not everyone has the skill
> >> >to do it. One has to learn to listen for the various kinds of
> >> >differences that audio cables have, and one first must have a lot of
> >> >recordings with different kinds of sounds on them.
> >>
> >> Not one single person has *ever* been able to demonstrate an ability
> >> to hear 'cable sound', when they did not *know* which cable was
> >> connected. Why do you think there's been a pool of about $5,000 lying
> >> on the table for six *years*, with no takers?
> >>
> >> > I find brushed
> >> >cymbals provide a very nice sound for comparative listening. Such a
> >> >recording as:
> >> >
> >> >Paul Motian Trio: Le Voyage
> >> >
> >> >is excellent.
> >> >
> >> >http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/B000024CHH/qid...
> >> >
> >> >http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000024CH...
> >> >
> >> >The ability or inability of the cable to pass transients well is
> >> >clearly revealed in such a recording. Continuous tones, such as voices,
> >> >are not as good to listen to.
> >>
> >> Utter rubbish. Are you prepared to step up to the plate and try your
> >> luck, or is this more baseless assertion?
> >
> >Why don't you try it yourself, and quite being a dogmatist? I have no
> >interest in meeting the requirements that you have set out. I
> >amskeptical about ABX.
>
> I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
> typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
> for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
> record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
> detailed recording of two great drummers.


And what did you do to control your bias that they would sound the
same?



Scott Wheeler
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 7:38:39 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
> <snip>
> > The skeptic claims: for all we know from the result of this test, there
> > could be a perceptual difference between the two sources in normal
> > listening (as opposed to testing) situations. For all we know, in
> > listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
> > or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
>
> To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
> distinction.

Not sure why.

> >
> > Ah, but the ABX-proponent says, then let him listen first to one
> > stretch, then the other, and if he derives greater pleasure from one
> > than the other, then he *will* be able to discriminate them.
>
> That is *implicit*. You cannot enjoy one more than the other without
> being able to discriminate between them. There would be *no* basis.
>

No basis for what?

I mean discrimination in the sense that Karl can reliably judge whether
A is the same as B. By pleasure I mean a feeling. So I am not
understanding the force of your "cannot." Exactly why is the following
impossible? Karl hears A and gets a strong feeling of pleasure. Then
he hears B and gets a weaker feeling of pleasure. By the time he gets
to the end of B, he has only a vague memory of A. So he cannot
reliably judge whether A was the same as B. How or in what sense is
this impossible?


> > The
> > skeptic replies, not necessarily. He will be able to do this only if,
> > say, he is good at *comparing* the pleasure he derives from one passage
> > with the pleasure that he derives from the other.
>
> If not, then he cannot, by definition, know that he enjoyed one more
> than another.
>

Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
that he knew he did.

> > And he may not be
> > good at this if he is not able to retain an accurate representation in
> > memory of the pleasure derived from the first while he listens to the
> > second, or if he is just not very good at comparing two memory traces.
> > In other words, to say he *must* be able to discriminate in such a case
> > is to impute to him a greater power of introspection than he may in
> > fact have.
>
> Nonsense. You have already *stipulated* that he enjoyed one more than
> another. That very fact *defines* extant discrimination.

Suppose I went to a greasy spoon in 1999 and had a cold hamburger.
Then in 2005 I went to a fancy restaurant and got a great meal. I got
greater pleasure from the latter than I got from the former. But I
could have completely forgotten about the first meal by the time I got
to the second. It can be a fact that I enjoyed one more than I enjoyed
the other even though no comparison took place. (I enjoyed one to
degree x, I enjoyed the other to degree y, and x is greater than y.)

>
> >
> > OK, then the ABXer's response is that the skeptic's notion that two
> > experiences can differ in satisfaction or pleasure derived, if they
> > cannot be reliably discriminated as such, is empirically meaningless.
>
> No, rather, that which is not repeatable is not considered valid
> empirical data.
>
> > The skeptic replies: not necessarily. For example, if during listening
> > Karl is asked to rate his satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10, and if
> > the ratings for one source are significantly different from those of
> > the other, that would be an empirical difference.
>
> And if these results were not repeatable, then they would be empirically
> meaningless, within the context of a verifiable difference (sonically,
> emotionally, musically, whatever). Further, if the tests were not
> relatively contemporaneous, Karl's emotional state would be as likely,
> if not more so, to be responsible for a disparate reaction (between A
> and B for e.g.) than would be an actual audible difference. Certainly it
> would introduce sufficient doubt as to invalidate the test.
>
> > (And it wouldn't
> > follow from the fact that the ratings are significantly different that
> > Karl would be able to pass a *discrimination* test.
>
> He just *did* 'pass' a discrimination test, by definition. That he
> didn't say "A is better than B" is irrelevant. If he states that "A
> engenders a pleasure level of 9 and B engenders a pleasure level of 2"
> he has clearly discriminated between the systems.

Yes, I agree with you on that, but I am talking about discrimination of
the kind where you have to say if A is the same as B.

>
> > Differential
> > response, in one situation, does not necessarily imply an ability to
> > *compare* reliably, in a much different situation.)
>
> Reproducibility is the hallmark of *valid* data, irrespective of
> context. If, in the context the orginal observation was made, the
> observation cannot be repeated, it must be considered either an anomaly,
> or simply erroneous. There are no other interpretations, although there
> are a myriad of possible underlying causes.

Yes, I agree with that too. It is important that the differential
response be reproducible and that extraneous causes be controlled for.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 7:39:29 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
> > ... but the ABX-proponent says, then let him listen first to one
> > stretch, then the other, and if he derives greater pleasure from one
> > than the other, then he *will* be able to discriminate them. The
> > skeptic replies, not necessarily. He will be able to do this only if,
> > say, he is good at *comparing* the pleasure he derives from one passage
> > with the pleasure that he derives from the other. And he may not be
> > good at this if he is not able to retain an accurate representation in
> > memory of the pleasure derived from the first while he listens to the
> > second, or if he is just not very good at comparing two memory traces.
> > In other words, to say he *must* be able to discriminate in such a case
> > is to impute to him a greater power of introspection than he may in
> > fact have.
>
> Except that, if he's unable to do this blind, then he is unable to do
> it sighted. If he's no good at comparing the pleasure he derives from
> each, then how did he arrive at the original judgment that SACD sounds
> better than CD? (And if he didn't start from this, why even do the
> blind test?)

Good question ... He arrived at the original judgment (more like a
vague impression) in an unscientific way, influenced by various
factors, including expectation.

>
> And assuming he did somehow arrive at the original judgment that SACD
> sounds better than CD, why can he not duplicate that comparison blind,
> multiple times, to see if he arrives at the same judgment consistently?
> I'll tell you why--because he's afraid of the result.

Or because the original comparison was unscientific to begin with,
where numerous factors aren't controlled for. If you repeat the same
5-minute passage, how do you control for changes in attention, the
effect of having heard the passage already, fatigue, and so on? No
wonder it's not easily repeatable. Perhaps there is just something
random or intermittent in our response.

The idea is to replace this with something scientific. But the
inadequacy of the original comparison by scientific standards does
nothing to establish, one way or the other, the adequacy of a
particular test.

>
> > OK, then the ABXer's response is that the skeptic's notion that two
> > experiences can differ in satisfaction or pleasure derived, if they
> > cannot be reliably discriminated as such, is empirically meaningless.
> > The skeptic replies: not necessarily. For example, if during listening
> > Karl is asked to rate his satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10, and if
> > the ratings for one source are significantly different from those of
> > the other, that would be an empirical difference.
>
> "If" isn't empirical. All the empirical evidence suggests that a test
> like this would fail, for reasons you've been given over and over and
> over again. Give it a rest.

Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
given over and over and over again."

>
> > (And it wouldn't
> > follow from the fact that the ratings are significantly different that
> > Karl would be able to pass a *discrimination* test. Differential
> > response, in one situation, does not necessarily imply an ability to
> > *compare* reliably, in a much different situation.)
>
> Opinion stated as fact. There is no evidence that "discrimination" in
> hearing and "comparing" in hearing are different. You are merely
> playing at semantics, without a shred of evidence to back you up.

I am saying it doesn't logically follow, and that is a fact not an
opinion. So again ... what seems to follow from what you're saying is
that no one knows. Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
within statistical bounds), then what is it? Has this been studied?

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 7:40:23 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
> <snip>
> > The skeptic claims: for all we know from the result of this test, there
> > could be a perceptual difference between the two sources in normal
> > listening (as opposed to testing) situations. For all we know, in
> > listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
> > or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
>
> To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
> distinction.

p.s. There is a difference between

1. Karl listens to SACD and derives pleasure in the amount x. Then he
listens to CD and derives pleasure in the amount y. And x is greater
than y.

2. Everything in 1, and, moreover, Karl judges *that* the pleasure he
derived from SACD is greater than the pleasure he derived from CD.

In 1, it is the case that x is greater than y. In 2, not only is it
the case, but Karl judges it to be the case.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 7:44:51 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 23 Jul 2005 18:11:58 GMT, William Eckle <abuse@wmeckle.com> wrote:

>On 23 Jul 2005 17:10:46 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
>wrote (among other things):
>
>>I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
>>typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
>>for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
>>record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
>>detailed recording of two great drummers.
>
> Looks to me like the statement "two great drummers" is an
>opinion. Not in my experience, there have been hundreds of better
>drummers make the scene over the past 80 years.

That would also be an opinion, and much more contentious. IMNVHO, Jim
Keltner is one of the top ten of all time, and Ron Tutt will of course
always be famous as drummer to the King. Besides, WTF has any of that
to do with the sound quality of that recording?
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 7:45:33 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 23 Jul 2005 22:00:30 GMT, Theporkygeorge@aol.com wrote:

>Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
>> On 22 Jul 2005 23:48:32 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>>
>> >Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
>> >> On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
>> >> >scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are there to be
>> >> >heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
>> >> >two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
>> >>
>> >> The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.
>> >
>> >No, it certainly is not. To say so is to take a dogmatic position.
>>
>> Nope, it is an opinion based on much testing.
>
>"Much testing?"

At least twenty of my own, plus those of Tom Nousaine, Arny et al. As
against *zero* of the opposing camp.

>> To say that there *are*
>> audible differences, in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
>> evidence that this is the case, is indeed dogmatic, a true act of
>> blind faith.
>
>To say the opposite in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
>evidence is every bit as dogmatic and every bit true act of blind
>faith.

Except of course that your claim is false - there is plenty of
evidence.

>There have ben numerous acounts of claims of difference under
>blind conditions.

None of them however stood up under examination, Zip's 'Sunshine
Trials' being a classic in this regard, where he claimed to have
'aced' the test blind, but fell apart totally when Nousaine and Maki
actually put him to a properly controlled blind test.

> What you are really doing is simply picking and
>choosing your anecdotal evidence. One can draw any conclusion they wish
>to draw with this MO.

You however don't even have *that* luxury, as you have nothing from
which to choose. As ever, you're just arguing for the sake of it.

>> >Why don't you try it yourself, and quite being a dogmatist? I have no
>> >interest in meeting the requirements that you have set out. I
>> >amskeptical about ABX.
>>
>> I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
>> typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
>> for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
>> record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
>> detailed recording of two great drummers.
>
>And what did you do to control your bias that they would sound the
>same?

At that time, I had no such 'bias', I was still a true believer. My
current view came later, after many such tests failed to reveal *any*
difference whatever among cables, and none among well-designed amps
and CD players either.
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
July 24, 2005 10:53:06 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

In article <dc0d1j0qsg@news3.newsguy.com>,
Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk> wrote:

> On 23 Jul 2005 18:11:58 GMT, William Eckle <abuse@wmeckle.com> wrote:
>
> >On 23 Jul 2005 17:10:46 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
> >wrote (among other things):
> >
> >>I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
> >>typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
> >>for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
> >>record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
> >>detailed recording of two great drummers.
> >
> > Looks to me like the statement "two great drummers" is an
> >opinion. Not in my experience, there have been hundreds of better
> >drummers make the scene over the past 80 years.
>
> That would also be an opinion, and much more contentious. IMNVHO, Jim
> Keltner is one of the top ten of all time <snip>

While I would certainly agree that Keltner is almost mythic in session
playing circles...probably the best known along with Stevie Gadd..... it
is certainly difficult to make "top ten of all time" sort of statements.
Do you mean only rock drummers? All percussionists? If the later, how
does one compare Keltner to Bellson to Rich to Mitch Peters? I don't
mean to be argumentative or "contrary", but that kind of statement
always raises my hackles bit :-)
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 10:53:28 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 24 Jul 2005 15:44:51 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
wrote:

>On 23 Jul 2005 18:11:58 GMT, William Eckle <abuse@wmeckle.com> wrote:
>
>>On 23 Jul 2005 17:10:46 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
>>wrote (among other things):
>>
>>>I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
>>>typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
>>>for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
>>>record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
>>>detailed recording of two great drummers.
>>
>> Looks to me like the statement "two great drummers" is an
>>opinion. Not in my experience, there have been hundreds of better
>>drummers make the scene over the past 80 years.
>
>That would also be an opinion, and much more contentious. IMNVHO, Jim
>Keltner is one of the top ten of all time, and Ron Tutt will of course
>always be famous as drummer to the King. Besides, WTF has any of that
>to do with the sound quality of that recording?

Not trying to be contentious, just trying to point out that
greatness (IMO) is not based on popularity. And opinions are based on
taste. I acknowledge we have vastly different tastes, and therefore
differnet opinions.


-=Bill Eckle=-
abuse@wmeckle.com
Vanity Web Page at:
http://www.wmeckle.com
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 10:53:59 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

"Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu> wrote in message
news:D c0cnh0qhn@news3.newsguy.com...
> nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>> > ... but the ABX-proponent says, then let him listen first to one
>> > stretch, then the other, and if he derives greater pleasure from one
>> > than the other, then he *will* be able to discriminate them. The
>> > skeptic replies, not necessarily. He will be able to do this only if,
>> > say, he is good at *comparing* the pleasure he derives from one passage
>> > with the pleasure that he derives from the other. And he may not be
>> > good at this if he is not able to retain an accurate representation in
>> > memory of the pleasure derived from the first while he listens to the
>> > second, or if he is just not very good at comparing two memory traces.
>> > In other words, to say he *must* be able to discriminate in such a case
>> > is to impute to him a greater power of introspection than he may in
>> > fact have.
>>
>> Except that, if he's unable to do this blind, then he is unable to do
>> it sighted. If he's no good at comparing the pleasure he derives from
>> each, then how did he arrive at the original judgment that SACD sounds
>> better than CD? (And if he didn't start from this, why even do the
>> blind test?)
>
> Good question ... He arrived at the original judgment (more like a
> vague impression) in an unscientific way, influenced by various
> factors, including expectation.
>
>>
>> And assuming he did somehow arrive at the original judgment that SACD
>> sounds better than CD, why can he not duplicate that comparison blind,
>> multiple times, to see if he arrives at the same judgment consistently?
>> I'll tell you why--because he's afraid of the result.
>
> Or because the original comparison was unscientific to begin with,
> where numerous factors aren't controlled for. If you repeat the same
> 5-minute passage, how do you control for changes in attention, the
> effect of having heard the passage already, fatigue, and so on? No
> wonder it's not easily repeatable. Perhaps there is just something
> random or intermittent in our response.
>
> The idea is to replace this with something scientific. But the
> inadequacy of the original comparison by scientific standards does
> nothing to establish, one way or the other, the adequacy of a
> particular test.
>
>>
>> > OK, then the ABXer's response is that the skeptic's notion that two
>> > experiences can differ in satisfaction or pleasure derived, if they
>> > cannot be reliably discriminated as such, is empirically meaningless.
>> > The skeptic replies: not necessarily. For example, if during listening
>> > Karl is asked to rate his satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10, and if
>> > the ratings for one source are significantly different from those of
>> > the other, that would be an empirical difference.
>>
>> "If" isn't empirical. All the empirical evidence suggests that a test
>> like this would fail, for reasons you've been given over and over and
>> over again. Give it a rest.
>
> Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
> can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
> auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
> that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
> given over and over and over again."
>
>>
>> > (And it wouldn't
>> > follow from the fact that the ratings are significantly different that
>> > Karl would be able to pass a *discrimination* test. Differential
>> > response, in one situation, does not necessarily imply an ability to
>> > *compare* reliably, in a much different situation.)
>>
>> Opinion stated as fact. There is no evidence that "discrimination" in
>> hearing and "comparing" in hearing are different. You are merely
>> playing at semantics, without a shred of evidence to back you up.
>
> I am saying it doesn't logically follow, and that is a fact not an
> opinion. So again ... what seems to follow from what you're saying is
> that no one knows. Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
> reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
> the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
> passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
> within statistical bounds), then what is it? Has this been studied?

Not to *my* knowledge. The way to do so is via monadic evaluative testing,
with the rating given for only one test variable, immediately after the fact
of listening. And then a statistical comparison to a second cell evaluating
the second variable. Such a test would put the fewest intervening variables
into the equation. And if such testing does show a difference, then
short-snippet, quick-switch AB and ABX tests can be evaluated to see if they
can reliably show the same result. Thus the former serves as a "control
test" to the latter.
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 10:55:32 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> Keith Hughes wrote:
>
>>Mark DeBellis wrote:
>>
>><snip>
>>
>>>The skeptic claims: for all we know from the result of this test, there
>>>could be a perceptual difference between the two sources in normal
>>>listening (as opposed to testing) situations. For all we know, in
>>>listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
>>>or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
>>
>>To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
>>distinction.
>
>
> Not sure why.
>

The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
you've made a distinction between them. You simply cannot enjoy one more
than the other if you think they are identical, or conversely, you
cannot think they are identical if you enjoy one more than the other.

>
>>>Ah, but the ABX-proponent says, then let him listen first to one
>>>stretch, then the other, and if he derives greater pleasure from one
>>>than the other, then he *will* be able to discriminate them.
>>
>>That is *implicit*. You cannot enjoy one more than the other without
>>being able to discriminate between them. There would be *no* basis.
>>
>
> No basis for what?

For a differential enjoyment response. If he thinks they are identical,
there can be no basis for a differential response. See above.
>
> I mean discrimination in the sense that Karl can reliably judge whether
> A is the same as B. By pleasure I mean a feeling. So I am not
> understanding the force of your "cannot." Exactly why is the following
> impossible? Karl hears A and gets a strong feeling of pleasure. Then
> he hears B and gets a weaker feeling of pleasure. By the time he gets
> to the end of B, he has only a vague memory of A. So he cannot
> reliably judge whether A was the same as B. How or in what sense is
> this impossible?
>
>
>
>>>The
>>>skeptic replies, not necessarily. He will be able to do this only if,
>>>say, he is good at *comparing* the pleasure he derives from one passage
>>>with the pleasure that he derives from the other.
>>
>>If not, then he cannot, by definition, know that he enjoyed one more
>>than another.
>>
>
>
> Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
> that he knew he did.

If he didn't *know* he did, then he didn't. You cannot have greater
enjoyment without a standard of lesser enjoyment to compare to.


>>>And he may not be
>>>good at this if he is not able to retain an accurate representation in
>>>memory of the pleasure derived from the first while he listens to the
>>>second, or if he is just not very good at comparing two memory traces.
>>>In other words, to say he *must* be able to discriminate in such a case
>>>is to impute to him a greater power of introspection than he may in
>>>fact have.
>>
>>Nonsense. You have already *stipulated* that he enjoyed one more than
>>another. That very fact *defines* extant discrimination.
>
>
> Suppose I went to a greasy spoon in 1999 and had a cold hamburger.
> Then in 2005 I went to a fancy restaurant and got a great meal. I got
> greater pleasure from the latter than I got from the former. But I
> could have completely forgotten about the first meal by the time I got
> to the second.

Putting aside the lack of relevance this has to time-proximate testing,
if you've completely forgotten the first meal, you *cannot* judge
comparable levels of enjoyment relative to the second meal. You have no
reference against which to compare.

> It can be a fact that I enjoyed one more than I enjoyed
> the other even though no comparison took place. (I enjoyed one to
> degree x, I enjoyed the other to degree y, and x is greater than y.)

But of course, you do not know this - the point you seem to be missing
here. Maybe both were X, maybe both were Y. If you cannot identify, let
alone quantify, what X is, you cannot determine that another experience
is "Y"...it might just as well be "X".

You cannot just say "well, OK but just *suppose* that he enjoyed one
more than the other, even though he doesn't remember one of them"
because that simply uncouples the scenario from objective reality. The
underlying basis for making comparative observations has been removed
when you 'suppose' results for a test case, but disallow the only
mechanism by which those results could be obtained.

As soon as you say "more than", a comparison is implicit. You're trying
to postulate a scenario such as "OK but suppose that 1999 cold burger
*were* to be compared, contemporaneously to the high dollar great meal,
I would have clearly enjoyed the great meal more than the burger". But
the fallacy in that postulate is that that comparison did not actually
happen, rather they are two time isolated non-quantified events, and you
cannot extrapolate comparison results for which you don't have the data.

Let's reconfigure your supposition to illustrate; Suppose in 1999 you
were out of work, hadn't had a real meal since breakfast yesterday, when
you sat down with that burger. Suppose further that in 2005, you took a
date you were crazy about to a fancy restaraunt, had a great meal in the
midst of which she dumped you. Would the circumstances affect your
relative level of enjoyment? I would say yes, clearly. Knowing the
*actual* response in 1999 *and* the actual response in 2005 is the
minimum predicate to determining which was more enjoyable to you.

No reference = no comparison = no basis for determining relative response.
>
>>>OK, then the ABXer's response is that the skeptic's notion that two
>>>experiences can differ in satisfaction or pleasure derived, if they
>>>cannot be reliably discriminated as such, is empirically meaningless.
>>
>>No, rather, that which is not repeatable is not considered valid
>>empirical data.
>>
>>
>>>The skeptic replies: not necessarily. For example, if during listening
>>>Karl is asked to rate his satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10, and if
>>>the ratings for one source are significantly different from those of
>>>the other, that would be an empirical difference.
>>
>>And if these results were not repeatable, then they would be empirically
>>meaningless, within the context of a verifiable difference (sonically,
>>emotionally, musically, whatever). Further, if the tests were not
>>relatively contemporaneous, Karl's emotional state would be as likely,
>>if not more so, to be responsible for a disparate reaction (between A
>>and B for e.g.) than would be an actual audible difference. Certainly it
>>would introduce sufficient doubt as to invalidate the test.
>>
>>
>>>(And it wouldn't
>>>follow from the fact that the ratings are significantly different that
>>>Karl would be able to pass a *discrimination* test.
>>
>>He just *did* 'pass' a discrimination test, by definition. That he
>>didn't say "A is better than B" is irrelevant. If he states that "A
>>engenders a pleasure level of 9 and B engenders a pleasure level of 2"
>>he has clearly discriminated between the systems.
>
>
> Yes, I agree with you on that, but I am talking about discrimination of
> the kind where you have to say if A is the same as B.

OK, I'm confused. You agree that saying the ability to identify one
system as a "9" and another as a "2" (relative to any parameter of
interest) demonstrates the ability to discriminate between them, but
that's different than being able to tell if they are the same??????

Discrimination between two systems/items/passages etc., for any
parameter, in any context, at any time, *defines* them as not the same.
How is this confusing?

>
>>>Differential
>>>response, in one situation, does not necessarily imply an ability to
>>>*compare* reliably, in a much different situation.)
>>
>>Reproducibility is the hallmark of *valid* data, irrespective of
>>context. If, in the context the orginal observation was made, the
>>observation cannot be repeated, it must be considered either an anomaly,
>>or simply erroneous. There are no other interpretations, although there
>>are a myriad of possible underlying causes.
>
>
> Yes, I agree with that too. It is important that the differential
> response be reproducible and that extraneous causes be controlled for.

Well, you must agree then that creating 'thought exercises' (like the
one above) that, by their very nature, preclude any possibility of
demonstrating reproducible results (you cannot repeatedly go back to
1999 for eg. - but if you find a way, I'm all ears:-) does nothing to
further understanding of the issue at hand.

Keith Hughes
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 24, 2005 10:58:27 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 23 Jul 2005 22:00:30 GMT, Theporkygeorge@aol.com wrote:
>
> >Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> >> On 22 Jul 2005 23:48:32 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
> >>
> >> >Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> >> >> On 21 Jul 2005 00:16:14 GMT, uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >I am just as sceptical as anyone, Stewart, but you go betyond
> >> >> >scepticism to dogmatism. You claim that no differences are there to be
> >> >> >heard, not that it is difficult to hear differences reliably. These are
> >> >> >two different claims. The former is dogmatic; the latter is sceptical.
> >> >>
> >> >> The former is however demonstrably true, making the latter redundant.
> >> >
> >> >No, it certainly is not. To say so is to take a dogmatic position.
> >>
> >> Nope, it is an opinion based on much testing.
> >
> >"Much testing?"
>
> At least twenty of my own, plus those of Tom Nousaine, Arny et al. As
> against *zero* of the opposing camp.


There you go again, picking and choosing your anecdotes. There are
plenty of anecdotal reports of people hearing differences amoung cables
under blind conditions.




>
> >> To say that there *are*
> >> audible differences, in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
> >> evidence that this is the case, is indeed dogmatic, a true act of
> >> blind faith.
> >
> >To say the opposite in the presence of *zero* reliable and repeatable
> >evidence is every bit as dogmatic and every bit true act of blind
> >faith.
>
> Except of course that your claim is false - there is plenty of
> evidence.


Nope. Plenty of anecdotes. As any person with any knowledge of science
would know, anecdotes are not good evidence.



>
> >There have ben numerous acounts of claims of difference under
> >blind conditions.
>
> None of them however stood up under examination,


How many of them have actually been propperly examined/


Zip's 'Sunshine
> Trials' being a classic in this regard,


Classic? If that's classic then the objectivists have no leg to stand
on.



where he claimed to have
> 'aced' the test blind, but fell apart totally when Nousaine and Maki
> actually put him to a properly controlled blind test.


That is your idea of a propperly controlled test? That does put things
into perspective. I'd like to see any published peer reviewed research
paper that contains all the baggage that the infamous "Sunshine trials"
had. Really, what a joke.





>
> > What you are really doing is simply picking and
> >choosing your anecdotal evidence. One can draw any conclusion they wish
> >to draw with this MO.
>
> You however don't even have *that* luxury,



It is not a luxery, it is a gross error in judgement. But you are right
i don't allow myself the luxry of making those kinds of gros errors.



> as you have nothing from
> which to choose.


As usual, you are wrong again. I have done numerous blind comparisons
on numerous subjects. I just don't pretend that i am doing valid
scientific research. You really seam to lack perspective.




> As ever, you're just arguing for the sake of it.



As ever you are now making unfounded personal attacks in the absence of
a legitimate argument.





>
> >> >Why don't you try it yourself, and quite being a dogmatist? I have no
> >> >interest in meeting the requirements that you have set out. I
> >> >amskeptical about ABX.
> >>
> >> I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
> >> typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
> >> for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
> >> record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
> >> detailed recording of two great drummers.
> >
> >And what did you do to control your bias that they would sound the
> >same?
>
> At that time, I had no such 'bias',



Really? Is that why you did twenty some odd tests as you claim? You
expected to hear a difference each and every time? Interesting.




> I was still a true believer.


I'd say you still are but anyways....



> My
> current view came later, after many such tests failed to reveal *any*
> difference whatever among cables, and none among well-designed amps
> and CD players either.


You never did tell us which of the amps were not well designed. Was it
the yamaha or the Levinson? But anyways, I have no problem with you
convincing yourself of whatever it is you believe. I just take issue
with your apparent belief that your convictions are actually better
than anybody eles's.



Scott Wheeler
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 25, 2005 1:25:49 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> Keith Hughes wrote:
> > Mark DeBellis wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> > > The skeptic claims: for all we know from the result of this test, there
> > > could be a perceptual difference between the two sources in normal
> > > listening (as opposed to testing) situations. For all we know, in
> > > listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
> > > or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
> >
> > To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
> > distinction.
>
> p.s. There is a difference between
>
> 1. Karl listens to SACD and derives pleasure in the amount x. Then he
> listens to CD and derives pleasure in the amount y. And x is greater
> than y.
>
> 2. Everything in 1, and, moreover, Karl judges *that* the pleasure he
> derived from SACD is greater than the pleasure he derived from CD.
>
> In 1, it is the case that x is greater than y. In 2, not only is it
> the case, but Karl judges it to be the case.

You're talking about Karl's perceptions. If Karl doesn't judge x to be
greater than y, then x isn't greater than y. You're merely playing at
semantics.

bob
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 25, 2005 1:26:40 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
> Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
> can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
> auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
> that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
> given over and over and over again."

Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
"just over the audible threshold." It doesn't matter whether the
context in which we hear that just noticeable difference (JND) is
background noise or something louder and more complex. It's still a
JND, and it's still "just over the audible threshold."

And, as Stewart explained to you, the louder and more complex that
context, the larger the difference has to be to be noticeable, because
of masking.

> > > (And it wouldn't
> > > follow from the fact that the ratings are significantly different that
> > > Karl would be able to pass a *discrimination* test. Differential
> > > response, in one situation, does not necessarily imply an ability to
> > > *compare* reliably, in a much different situation.)
> >
> > Opinion stated as fact. There is no evidence that "discrimination" in
> > hearing and "comparing" in hearing are different. You are merely
> > playing at semantics, without a shred of evidence to back you up.
>
> I am saying it doesn't logically follow, and that is a fact not an
> opinion.

Lots of physics won't logically follow if you don't know physics. Ditto
psychoacoustics.

> So again ... what seems to follow from what you're saying is
> that no one knows.

The only thing that seems to follow from this discussion is that YOU
don't know enough of the basic science here to render such judgments.

> Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
> reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
> the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
> passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
> within statistical bounds), then what is it?

There's no evidence whatever to this effect, because it is not true.
There is no reason to expect Karl to give the same rating twice, even
to identical stimuli. You could test Karl a large number of times, and
see if he rated one higher than the other consistently. But any
scientist would consider that a waste of time, since you've already
conceded that Karl can't distinguish between the two. And if a real
scientist wouldn't consider this worth doing, who are you to suggest
otherwise?

bob
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 25, 2005 1:27:10 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:

> And assuming he did somehow arrive at the original judgment that SACD
> sounds better than CD, why can he not duplicate that comparison blind,
> multiple times, to see if he arrives at the same judgment consistently?
> I'll tell you why--because he's afraid of the result.
>

p.s. I agree that there are illusions that occur in sighted comparison,
but it doesn't follow that where such illusions occur there aren't
*any* sonic differences between the sources, or differences that have a
differential effect on the brain. (For all I know, the brain sometimes
magnifies small sonic differences. Do we know it doesn't?)

This would be like when you see a stick in water and it appears bent,
and when you take it out you see it *is* (slightly) bent.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 4:37:49 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> You're talking about Karl's perceptions. If Karl doesn't judge x to be
> greater than y, then x isn't greater than y. You're merely playing at
> semantics.

Suppose one day Karl scratches his finger and another day he stubs his
toe. Later he cannot remember which one hurt worse. Are you saying
that one could not have hurt worse than the other?

The next day, however, he does remember that stubbing his toe hurt
worse. Does it now come to be a fact that it hurt worse? Or, as
common sense would suggest, does he now make a judgment about something
that was true all along?

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 4:39:25 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
> >
> > Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
> > can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
> > auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
> > that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
> > given over and over and over again."
>
> Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
> the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
> and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
> "just over the audible threshold." It doesn't matter whether the
> context in which we hear that just noticeable difference (JND) is
> background noise or something louder and more complex. It's still a
> JND, and it's still "just over the audible threshold."

So how do you get from the premise you cite, which is about very quiet
sounds, to the conclusion that whenever sounds can't be discriminated
from one another, the signals travelling in the auditory nerve must be
the same?

> > Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
> > reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
> > the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
> > passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
> > within statistical bounds), then what is it?
>
> There's no evidence whatever to this effect, because it is not true.
> There is no reason to expect Karl to give the same rating twice, even
> to identical stimuli. You could test Karl a large number of times, and
> see if he rated one higher than the other consistently. But any
> scientist would consider that a waste of time, since you've already
> conceded that Karl can't distinguish between the two.

It would be nice to know *why* the scientist thinks this, what the
scientific reason is for coming to this conclusion.

What is the evidence that, if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B
(in the sense of same/different judgments), he won't rate one higher
than the other consistently? Are you saying there is no such evidence?
Then on the basis of what does the scientist decide the question is a
waste of time? You are giving a grossly mistaken picture here of the
scientific attitude and method. Scientists do not decide matters such
as this a priori, without some basis in evidence.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 4:46:19 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 24 Jul 2005 18:53:06 GMT, Jenn <jennconducts@hotmail.com> wrote:

>In article <dc0d1j0qsg@news3.newsguy.com>,
> Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> On 23 Jul 2005 18:11:58 GMT, William Eckle <abuse@wmeckle.com> wrote:
>>
>> >On 23 Jul 2005 17:10:46 GMT, Stewart Pinkerton <patent3@dircon.co.uk>
>> >wrote (among other things):
>> >
>> >>I have tried it on many occasions with acoustic jazz, music which
>> >>typically does have a very large amount of cymbal brushwork. Purely
>> >>for test purposes, I also recommend the classic Sheffield 'Drum'
>> >>record in this regard, being an especially dynamic, wideband and
>> >>detailed recording of two great drummers.
>> >
>> > Looks to me like the statement "two great drummers" is an
>> >opinion. Not in my experience, there have been hundreds of better
>> >drummers make the scene over the past 80 years.
>>
>> That would also be an opinion, and much more contentious. IMNVHO, Jim
>> Keltner is one of the top ten of all time <snip>
>
>While I would certainly agree that Keltner is almost mythic in session
>playing circles...probably the best known along with Stevie Gadd..... it
>is certainly difficult to make "top ten of all time" sort of statements.

Nah, it's extremely easy to make such statements. Backing them up is
perhaps another matter...... :-)

>Do you mean only rock drummers? All percussionists? If the later, how
>does one compare Keltner to Bellson to Rich to Mitch Peters? I don't
>mean to be argumentative or "contrary", but that kind of statement
>always raises my hackles bit :-)

I entirely agree, which is why *my* hackles were raised at the
suggestion that there have ben "hundreds of better drummers" than
Keltner. And no, I wasn't including classical percussionists such as
Evelyn Glennie. OTOH, Bellson would certainly be in my personal top
ten, along with Joe Morello. And of course, let's not forget Ann
'Honey' Lantree....... :-)

--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 4:48:25 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
> > Keith Hughes wrote:
> >
> >>Mark DeBellis wrote:
> >>
> >>>For all we know, in
> >>>listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
> >>>or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
> >>

> >>To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
> >>distinction...
> >><snip>
> The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
> distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
> have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
> you've made a distinction between them.

I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)

> You simply cannot enjoy one more
> than the other if you think they are identical,

There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?


> > Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
> > that he knew he did.
>
> If he didn't *know* he did, then he didn't. You cannot have greater
> enjoyment without a standard of lesser enjoyment to compare to.
>

That is just false.

To change the example, suppose yesterday Karl scratched his finger
slightly. Today he stubbed his toe really hard. Consider the
statement

* The pain Karl felt on scratching his finger was less than the pain he
felt on stubbing his toe.

For * to be true, Karl doesn't have to know it's true or do a
comparison. By this morning, let's say for the sake of argument, he'd
forgotten all about yesterday.

There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and
Karl's knowing it to be true.


> > Suppose I went to a greasy spoon in 1999 and had a cold hamburger.
> > Then in 2005 I went to a fancy restaurant and got a great meal. I got
> > greater pleasure from the latter than I got from the former. But I
> > could have completely forgotten about the first meal by the time I got
> > to the second.
>
> Putting aside the lack of relevance this has to time-proximate testing,
> if you've completely forgotten the first meal, you *cannot* judge
> comparable levels of enjoyment relative to the second meal. You have no
> reference against which to compare.

We are taking a third-person perspective. To stick with the
toe-stubbing example, it is we who grasp the thought that one episode
is more painful than the other, not Karl.

It's not irrelevant because we are talking about problems of comparison
of longer excerpts.

>
> > It can be a fact that I enjoyed one more than I enjoyed
> > the other even though no comparison took place. (I enjoyed one to
> > degree x, I enjoyed the other to degree y, and x is greater than y.)
>
> But of course, you do not know this - the point you seem to be missing
> here. Maybe both were X, maybe both were Y. If you cannot identify, let
> alone quantify, what X is, you cannot determine that another experience
> is "Y"...it might just as well be "X".

Again, there is a difference between what we, on the outside looking
in, are specifying to be the case, and what the subject being described
is aware of. That can get confusing if the example is put in the first
person (as I had it), so let's stick with Karl! :-)

>
> You cannot just say "well, OK but just *suppose* that he enjoyed one
> more than the other, even though he doesn't remember one of them"
> because that simply uncouples the scenario from objective reality.

The thing about objective reality is that it continues to exist even
when it's not being measured or observed (on a macroscopic level
anyway, like the tree in the quad).

> The
> underlying basis for making comparative observations has been removed
> when you 'suppose' results for a test case, but disallow the only
> mechanism by which those results could be obtained.
>
> As soon as you say "more than", a comparison is implicit. You're trying
> to postulate a scenario such as "OK but suppose that 1999 cold burger
> *were* to be compared, contemporaneously to the high dollar great meal,
> I would have clearly enjoyed the great meal more than the burger". But
> the fallacy in that postulate is that that comparison did not actually
> happen, rather they are two time isolated non-quantified events, and you
> cannot extrapolate comparison results for which you don't have the data.

You seem to be saying something like the following: Pain 1 cannot be
meaningfully said to be greater than Pain 2 unless the subject actually
compares them. This is an extreme form of reductionism, or
verificationism, or operationalism. Surely, at the very least, we can
have evidence that Pain 1 is greater than Pain 2 in other ways, for
example, by measuring the force of the impact on the toe, noting
whether Karl says "Ow!" etc.


> > ... I am talking about discrimination of
> > the kind where you have to say if A is the same as B.
>
> OK, I'm confused. You agree that saying the ability to identify one
> system as a "9" and another as a "2" (relative to any parameter of
> interest) demonstrates the ability to discriminate between them, but
> that's different than being able to tell if they are the same??????

There are two relevant kinds of tasks. One involves listening to
sources A and B and judging if they are the same or different. The
other involves rating (say) how much you like a given source.

I am saying I do not see how these tasks are equivalent. There can be
memory effects that play a role in one but not the other.

I do agree with you that both can aptly be called "discrimination," but
I had been using that term to mean the first of the two kinds. Maybe
"same/different judgment" would be a better term.

> Discrimination between two systems/items/passages etc., for any
> parameter, in any context, at any time, *defines* them as not the same.

If Karl responds differently to A and B, does it follow that he judges
*that* they are not the same? No, as the toe-stubbing example
illustrates.

Moreover, the outcome of a "rating" test need not (as far as I can see)
correspond exactly to that of a "same/different judgment" test. If
Karl gives higher ratings to A than B in the first sort of testing
protocol, does it follow that, in the second sort of test, if he
listens first to A then B, he will be able to judge correctly whether
they are the same? I don't see why.

> Well, you must agree then that creating 'thought exercises' (like the
> one above) that, by their very nature, preclude any possibility of
> demonstrating reproducible results (you cannot repeatedly go back to
> 1999 for eg. - but if you find a way, I'm all ears:-) does nothing to
> further understanding of the issue at hand.

The principal value of thought exercises is to exercise thought, and I
don't think that's at all irrelevant to understanding. (I think we
agree about a lot, but diverge on the claim, "You cannot just say
'well, OK but just *suppose* ....'" Why can't I say that?)

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:02:08 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> > Mark DeBellis wrote:
> > >
> > > Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
> > > can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
> > > auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
> > > that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
> > > given over and over and over again."
> >
> > Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
> > the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
> > and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
> > "just over the audible threshold." It doesn't matter whether the
> > context in which we hear that just noticeable difference (JND) is
> > background noise or something louder and more complex. It's still a
> > JND, and it's still "just over the audible threshold."
>
> So how do you get from the premise you cite, which is about very quiet
> sounds,

No, it's not. It's about just noticeable differences within what may be
very loud sounds.

> to the conclusion that whenever sounds can't be discriminated
> from one another, the signals travelling in the auditory nerve must be
> the same?

What do you mean, how do I get there? I'm already there. If you accept
as fact the idea that DBTs and measurements of nerve reactions give
similar estimates of JNDs, then the conclusion is a slam-dunk, as
George Tenet would say.

If you don't accept that as fact, take it up with experts in the field,
of which I am not one.

> > > Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
> > > reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
> > > the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
> > > passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
> > > within statistical bounds), then what is it?
> >
> > There's no evidence whatever to this effect, because it is not true.
> > There is no reason to expect Karl to give the same rating twice, even
> > to identical stimuli. You could test Karl a large number of times, and
> > see if he rated one higher than the other consistently. But any
> > scientist would consider that a waste of time, since you've already
> > conceded that Karl can't distinguish between the two.
>
> It would be nice to know *why* the scientist thinks this,

Because he has done the work.

> what the
> scientific reason is for coming to this conclusion.
> What is the evidence that, if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B
> (in the sense of same/different judgments), he won't rate one higher
> than the other consistently? Are you saying there is no such evidence?
> Then on the basis of what does the scientist decide the question is a
> waste of time? You are giving a grossly mistaken picture here of the
> scientific attitude and method. Scientists do not decide matters such
> as this a priori, without some basis in evidence.

That's right, and we've tried to explain to you what the basis of that
evidence is. You apparently do not want to accept that, so I'll repeat
the advice above: Take it up with experts in the field. But be prepared
to be humbled.

bob
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:03:50 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
> >
> > Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
> > can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
> > auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
> > that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
> > given over and over and over again."
>
> Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
> the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
> and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
> "just over the audible threshold."

Incidentally, the use of "audible threshold" (or similar expressions
like "threshold of hearing") to mean absolute threshold is not at all
uncommon, and I do not see why it would be incorrect. Since you were
talking about the "quietest sounds that humans can detect," by
threshold I meant absolute threshold.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:05:41 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Harry Lavo wrote:

> Not to *my* knowledge. The way to do so is via monadic evaluative testing,
> with the rating given for only one test variable, immediately after the fact
> of listening. And then a statistical comparison to a second cell evaluating
> the second variable. Such a test would put the fewest intervening variables
> into the equation. And if such testing does show a difference, then
> short-snippet, quick-switch AB and ABX tests can be evaluated to see if they
> can reliably show the same result. Thus the former serves as a "control
> test" to the latter.

No comparative or evaluative listening can be "scientific", simply
because one is listening to one or the other at one moment, comparing
that to the memory of the other.

In other words, ABX testing is no more valuable than long-term
evaluation. It is scientifically worthless.
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:06:19 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
> the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
> and over again....
> The only thing that seems to follow from this discussion is that YOU
> don't know enough of the basic science here to render such judgments.

p.s. If we are going to go through this again, may I kindly point out
that last time you ended up agreeing with a point I had been urging all
along (that identification tests aren't equivalent to discrimination),
and that your explanation of how indiscriminable sounds necessarily
correspond to identical neural signals is seriously incomplete. So
could we stick to the issues please? Thank you.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:10:52 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:

>>>Keith Hughes wrote:

<snip>
>>
>>The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
>>distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
>>have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
>>you've made a distinction between them.
>
>
> I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
> Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
> order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
> than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)

You *cannot* look at it from the outside. That's the point. Karl's
satisfaction must be apprehended *by him* or it simply does not exist,
and there is no mechanism by which an "outside" observer can ascertain
that Karl liked one better than the other. You are trying to create a
scenario where *your* interpretation of Karls internal reality supplants
his actual perception, and then base an argument on what you presume
Karl's response would have been had he had a response. This is fantasy,
not theoretical supposition.
>
>>You simply cannot enjoy one more
>>than the other if you think they are identical,
>
>
> There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
> identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
> the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
> more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
> different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?

This is the same as "the same". Two presentations are the same, or they
are different. If, for whatever reason, you do not distinguish between
the two, then for your internal reality, they are the same. You do not
have to make a conscious evaluation of "sameness", the absence of
conscious "difference" is the same thing.

>
>
>>>Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
>>>that he knew he did.
>>
>>If he didn't *know* he did, then he didn't. You cannot have greater
>>enjoyment without a standard of lesser enjoyment to compare to.
>>
>
>
> That is just false.

Simple logic, and use of English. Greater than...what? Cite one,
grammatically correct, example of where you can say "X is greater than"
without supplying a reference quantity.

>
> To change the example, suppose yesterday Karl scratched his finger
> slightly. Today he stubbed his toe really hard. Consider the
> statement
>
> * The pain Karl felt on scratching his finger was less than the pain he
> felt on stubbing his toe.

You *might* make the statement that the neuronal excitation resulting
from the scratch was less than resulting from the toe stubbing, but you
cannot interpret, FOR HIM, the relative level of his apprehension of
pain. Don't confuse level of stimulus with level of perception - while
they may be proportional at times, at other times, given other physical
and emotional inputs, they may have no correlation whatsoever.
>
> For * to be true, Karl doesn't have to know it's true or do a
> comparison. By this morning, let's say for the sake of argument, he'd
> forgotten all about yesterday.
>
> There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and
> Karl's knowing it to be true.

No, there is not, not when Karls perception is the subject at hand.
*YOU* do not, cannot, and will never have the capacity by which to judge
Karl's perception of events. You are trying to project what *you*
believe to be an absolute level (in this case pain) of response, based
on *your* personal psychological/physiological makeup, onto Karl and
assume that holds true for all circumstances. This is untenable.

You again miss the basic point. No one other than Karl can assess
whether the scratch or the stubb was more painful. If Karl didn't do it
(i.e. he didn't compare them), then no comparison was made, and there is
no objective data to determine his relative response. You can suppose
all day about what you think his response obviously would have been, but
that is pointless since *you* cannot know. The severity of the injury is
not directly proportional to the perception of pain.

>
>
>>>Suppose I went to a greasy spoon in 1999 and had a cold hamburger.
>>>Then in 2005 I went to a fancy restaurant and got a great meal. I got
>>>greater pleasure from the latter than I got from the former. But I
>>>could have completely forgotten about the first meal by the time I got
>>>to the second.
>>
>>Putting aside the lack of relevance this has to time-proximate testing,
>>if you've completely forgotten the first meal, you *cannot* judge
>>comparable levels of enjoyment relative to the second meal. You have no
>>reference against which to compare.
>
>
> We are taking a third-person perspective. To stick with the
> toe-stubbing example, it is we who grasp the thought that one episode
> is more painful than the other, not Karl.

This is ludicrous. *We* cannot grasp the internal response of another
person. We can question that individual and determine their response,
but when they have none (as in your example), it is pure fantasy to say
*we know what Karl felt, even though he doesn't*. You're using Karls
perception on the one hand to prove your point, while on the other hand
you're saying Karls perception is irrelevant because *we* know what it
was whether he peceived it or not.


> It's not irrelevant because we are talking about problems of comparison
> of longer excerpts.
>
>
>>>It can be a fact that I enjoyed one more than I enjoyed
>>>the other even though no comparison took place. (I enjoyed one to
>>>degree x, I enjoyed the other to degree y, and x is greater than y.)
>>
>>But of course, you do not know this - the point you seem to be missing
>>here. Maybe both were X, maybe both were Y. If you cannot identify, let
>>alone quantify, what X is, you cannot determine that another experience
>>is "Y"...it might just as well be "X".
>
>
> Again, there is a difference between what we, on the outside looking
> in, are specifying to be the case,

The fallacy in a nutshell. You specify Karls response (separate from any
perception that Karl may have) and then use that to as though it were
actual data, to support your position.

> and what the subject being described
> is aware of. That can get confusing if the example is put in the first
> person (as I had it), so let's stick with Karl! :-)

Not confusing at all. Just illogical. You once again want to stipulate
that Karl has perceptual responses that A) he does not know about, and
B) about events does not remember, and C) we on the outside nonetheless
know the internal perceptual response he had but was unaware of. If
Karl is unaware of it of a perception, then he *DID NOT HAVE IT*. It is
not a perception if he is unaware of it - that's sort of the hallmark of
perception. Your whole argument is based on this fallacy; that we can
assume Karl had a perception that he didn't know about, and proceed from
there to create causes and relationships for differential perceptions
that he didn't have.

>
>>You cannot just say "well, OK but just *suppose* that he enjoyed one
>>more than the other, even though he doesn't remember one of them"
>>because that simply uncouples the scenario from objective reality.
>
>
> The thing about objective reality is that it continues to exist even
> when it's not being measured or observed (on a macroscopic level
> anyway, like the tree in the quad).

The objective reality is that Karl perceives an event, or he does not.
We're not talking about Newtonian physics here, we're talking about
*perception*. You can't talk about the perception that Karl was unaware
of - without awareness there was no perception. If your postulate
requires Karl to have serial perceptions of which he is unaware or can't
remember, the lack of utility seems obvious.

>
>>The
>>underlying basis for making comparative observations has been removed
>>when you 'suppose' results for a test case, but disallow the only
>>mechanism by which those results could be obtained.
>>
>>As soon as you say "more than", a comparison is implicit. You're trying
>>to postulate a scenario such as "OK but suppose that 1999 cold burger
>>*were* to be compared, contemporaneously to the high dollar great meal,
>>I would have clearly enjoyed the great meal more than the burger". But
>>the fallacy in that postulate is that that comparison did not actually
>>happen, rather they are two time isolated non-quantified events, and you
>>cannot extrapolate comparison results for which you don't have the data.
>
>
> You seem to be saying something like the following: Pain 1 cannot be
> meaningfully said to be greater than Pain 2 unless the subject actually
> compares them.

Quite true, because the perception of pain is A) not necessarily
coupled, in magnitude, to the stimulus, and B) *ONLY* the subject can
make the determination that pain1 is greater or less than pain2, and C)
sans comparison of the two, even the subject cannot say which is greater
or lesser.

> This is an extreme form of reductionism, or
> verificationism, or operationalism.

No, just an awareness of how perception is not always coupled to
externally observable reality. Perception is dependent on the peculiar
cognitive processes of the individual under study, and can vary by
orders of magnitude as the test conditions (including subject
conditions) are varied. You're trying to pretend that everyone perceives
a given stimulus in an identical fashion, under all circumstances. A
quick Google search for "shock" will quickly disabuse you of that
misapprehension.

> Surely, at the very least, we can
> have evidence that Pain 1 is greater than Pain 2 in other ways, for
> example, by measuring the force of the impact on the toe,

We can monitor the stimulus, certainly. We cannot extrapolate from that
what Karls perception will be. Sure, if we cut off his arm *we* know
that will hurt more than breaking his toe. But for your argument to have
any legs (pun intented) we have to pretend that Karl forgot about the
broken toe and the severed arm. Not going to happen.

> noting
> whether Karl says "Ow!" etc.

He says "Ow" both times. What did we learn?

>
>>>... I am talking about discrimination of
>>>the kind where you have to say if A is the same as B.
>>
>>OK, I'm confused. You agree that saying the ability to identify one
>>system as a "9" and another as a "2" (relative to any parameter of
>>interest) demonstrates the ability to discriminate between them, but
>>that's different than being able to tell if they are the same??????
>
>
> There are two relevant kinds of tasks. One involves listening to
> sources A and B and judging if they are the same or different. The
> other involves rating (say) how much you like a given source.
>
> I am saying I do not see how these tasks are equivalent. There can be
> memory effects that play a role in one but not the other.

OK, since you seem analogy driven, how can you say that you like an
Outback steak more than a Big Mac if you can't tell them apart? You like
Coke better than Pepsi, but they taste exactly the same to you. What is
your preference based on? You were much happier last month than this
month, but you can't remember last month. These things do not logically
follow. Two things are either the same, or they are different. If you
like one more than the other, then you are saying they are different.
There may be differences in the evaluative processes used, but the fact
remains that if you judge them the same, you have no basis for creating
a preference. If you *have* a preference, it is implicit that you
believe they are different. This is really a very simple logic exercise.


> I do agree with you that both can aptly be called "discrimination," but
> I had been using that term to mean the first of the two kinds. Maybe
> "same/different judgment" would be a better term.

You're trying to use semantics to create an illusion of difference, and
it doesn't wash. No matter how you cut it, if you have a preference, you
have judged "different", or you lack the capacity for logic. If you
ajudge "same", and yet have a preference, you once again are logically
challenged.

>
>>Discrimination between two systems/items/passages etc., for any
>>parameter, in any context, at any time, *defines* them as not the same.
>
>
> If Karl responds differently to A and B, does it follow that he judges
> *that* they are not the same? No, as the toe-stubbing example
> illustrates.

Failed to illustrate you mean. *YOU* cannot judge Karls perception, and
if he is unaware of it, it is not perception.

> Moreover, the outcome of a "rating" test need not (as far as I can see)
> correspond exactly to that of a "same/different judgment" test. If
> Karl gives higher ratings to A than B in the first sort of testing
> protocol,

If he does it blind, and level matched, and can achieve statistically
valid results, then he can indeed tell them apart. If it's not
reproducible, then the test means nothing, and the whole thing is moot.

> does it follow that, in the second sort of test, if he
> listens first to A then B, he will be able to judge correctly whether
> they are the same?

Yes, it does. *If* he meets the criteria detailed above.

> I don't see why.

I'm aware. How is this different? Answer...it's not. All Karl has to do
is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above. He say's to himself, "Hmmmm, I
like A better than B, logic dictates that they must be different". And
he's already shown he can decide which he likes better. It is a matter
of the most rudimetary logic to extrapolate the "I like A more than B"
to A is different than B.

>
>>Well, you must agree then that creating 'thought exercises' (like the
>>one above) that, by their very nature, preclude any possibility of
>>demonstrating reproducible results (you cannot repeatedly go back to
>>1999 for eg. - but if you find a way, I'm all ears:-) does nothing to
>>further understanding of the issue at hand.
>
>
> The principal value of thought exercises is to exercise thought, and I
> don't think that's at all irrelevant to understanding. (I think we
> agree about a lot, but diverge on the claim, "You cannot just say
> 'well, OK but just *suppose* ....'" Why can't I say that?)

Oh you can say that...just don't snip the part about supposing a set of
results, while stipulating a methodology that precludes any chance of
achieving those results, and then pretending that the method has rigor.

Keith Hughes
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:11:33 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 26 Jul 2005 00:39:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
wrote:

>nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>> >
>> > Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
>> > can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
>> > auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
>> > that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
>> > given over and over and over again."
>>
>> Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
>> the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
>> and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
>> "just over the audible threshold." It doesn't matter whether the
>> context in which we hear that just noticeable difference (JND) is
>> background noise or something louder and more complex. It's still a
>> JND, and it's still "just over the audible threshold."
>
>So how do you get from the premise you cite, which is about very quiet
>sounds, to the conclusion that whenever sounds can't be discriminated
>from one another, the signals travelling in the auditory nerve must be
>the same?

That's not a commutative statement. What was said was that, if there's
no difference in the nerve impulse, it's *impossible* for there to be
an audible difference. If all cats are black, that doesn't make all
black animals cats.

>> > Or, if there is evidence or compelling theoretical
>> > reason to believe that if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B (in
>> > the sense of same-different judgments), where A and B are long
>> > passages, then he *must* give them the same ratings (more or less,
>> > within statistical bounds), then what is it?
>>
>> There's no evidence whatever to this effect, because it is not true.
>> There is no reason to expect Karl to give the same rating twice, even
>> to identical stimuli. You could test Karl a large number of times, and
>> see if he rated one higher than the other consistently. But any
>> scientist would consider that a waste of time, since you've already
>> conceded that Karl can't distinguish between the two.
>
>It would be nice to know *why* the scientist thinks this, what the
>scientific reason is for coming to this conclusion.

Because he thinks logically? If it's a given that he can't
discriminate the two stimuli, there is simply no interest in testing
him, it would be a priori a waste of time.

>What is the evidence that, if Karl can't reliably discriminate A from B
>(in the sense of same/different judgments), he won't rate one higher
>than the other consistently?

Statistics. Given that it's a blind test, of course. In sighted
listening, sound quality is one of the more minor differentiators.....

> Are you saying there is no such evidence?
>Then on the basis of what does the scientist decide the question is a
>waste of time? You are giving a grossly mistaken picture here of the
>scientific attitude and method. Scientists do not decide matters such
>as this a priori, without some basis in evidence.

They do, if the inability to discriminate is already conceded. That
would be like sending a lunar mission to test for green cheese.
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:12:00 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 26 Jul 2005 00:48:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
wrote:

>Keith Hughes wrote:
>> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>> > Keith Hughes wrote:
>> >
>> >>Mark DeBellis wrote:
>> >>
>> >>>For all we know, in
>> >>>listening to 5-minute stretches, say, Karl derives greater satisfaction
>> >>>or pleasure from one source than he does from the other.
>> >>
>
>> >>To postulate this requires stipulating that Karl did, indeed, make a
>> >>distinction...
>> >><snip>
>> The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
>> distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
>> have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
>> you've made a distinction between them.
>
>I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
>Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
>order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
>than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)
>
>> You simply cannot enjoy one more
>> than the other if you think they are identical,
>
>There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
>identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
>the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
>more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
>different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?

What if he doesn't care? What if *we* don't care?

>> > Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
>> > that he knew he did.
>>
>> If he didn't *know* he did, then he didn't. You cannot have greater
>> enjoyment without a standard of lesser enjoyment to compare to.
>>
>That is just false.

No, it's an obvious truism.

>To change the example, suppose yesterday Karl scratched his finger
>slightly. Today he stubbed his toe really hard. Consider the
>statement
>
>* The pain Karl felt on scratching his finger was less than the pain he
>felt on stubbing his toe.
>
>For * to be true, Karl doesn't have to know it's true or do a
>comparison. By this morning, let's say for the sake of argument, he'd
>forgotten all about yesterday.
>
>There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and
>Karl's knowing it to be true.
>
>
>> > Suppose I went to a greasy spoon in 1999 and had a cold hamburger.
>> > Then in 2005 I went to a fancy restaurant and got a great meal. I got
>> > greater pleasure from the latter than I got from the former. But I
>> > could have completely forgotten about the first meal by the time I got
>> > to the second.
>>
>> Putting aside the lack of relevance this has to time-proximate testing,
>> if you've completely forgotten the first meal, you *cannot* judge
>> comparable levels of enjoyment relative to the second meal. You have no
>> reference against which to compare.
>
>We are taking a third-person perspective. To stick with the
>toe-stubbing example, it is we who grasp the thought that one episode
>is more painful than the other, not Karl.
>
>It's not irrelevant because we are talking about problems of comparison
>of longer excerpts.

Sure it's irrelevant. How do *you* know how Karl feels pain? You make
a classic scientific error. He may have damaged nerves in his toe and
feel little sensation. You are *assuming* something about the
*perception* of another person.


>The principal value of thought exercises is to exercise thought, and I
>don't think that's at all irrelevant to understanding. (I think we
>agree about a lot, but diverge on the claim, "You cannot just say
>'well, OK but just *suppose* ....'" Why can't I say that?)

You can certainly say it. What you can *not* do is have any reasonable
expectation that anyone will take you seriously.
--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 26, 2005 10:12:41 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> There's no evidence whatever to this effect, because it is not true.
> There is no reason to expect Karl to give the same rating twice, even
> to identical stimuli. You could test Karl a large number of times, and
> see if he rated one higher than the other consistently. But any
> scientist would consider that a waste of time, since you've already
> conceded that Karl can't distinguish between the two. And if a real
> scientist wouldn't consider this worth doing, who are you to suggest
> otherwise?

I am envisioning the possibility that someone might not be able to
discriminate between two signals on a same/different judgment test, but
that the effects of the signals on the person over extended listening
might be different -- say, one is slightly more fatiguing or less
pleasant than the other. (If you say this couldn't happen unless the
signals travelling in the auditory nerve are different, then include
this too.)

If I understand you right, you are saying science says *that* this
can't happen. Fine; thank you for the information. But I want to
know *why*, according to science, it can't happen. How does science
know that it can't happen?

And please, could we go beyond

1. There is no evidence that it can happen

and

2. Scientists don't take the idea seriously that it could happen.

Regarding 1, to say that there is no evidence for p doesn't mean that
there is evidence for not-p. There is no evidence that the number of
stars in the universe is even, but that doesn't demonstrate that the
number of stars is odd. I would like to know what the scientific
evidence is, or what the theoretical reasons are, that what I am
envisioning above can't be the case.

Regarding 2, again, if that is the conclusion scientists come to I
would like to know *how* they know it to be true.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 27, 2005 12:40:22 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
> Harry Lavo wrote:

> > Not to *my* knowledge. The way to do so is via monadic evaluative testing,
> > with the rating given for only one test variable, immediately after the fact
> > of listening. And then a statistical comparison to a second cell evaluating
> > the second variable. Such a test would put the fewest intervening variables
> > into the equation. And if such testing does show a difference, then
> > short-snippet, quick-switch AB and ABX tests can be evaluated to see if they
> > can reliably show the same result. Thus the former serves as a "control
> > test" to the latter.

> No comparative or evaluative listening can be "scientific", simply
> because one is listening to one or the other at one moment, comparing
> that to the memory of the other.

That will be astonishing and certainly paradigm-changing news to the
scientific fields of perceptual psychology in general and psychoacoustics
in particular. I urge you to publish your findings in a peer-reviewed
journal ASAP.

> In other words, ABX testing is no more valuable than long-term
> evaluation. It is scientifically worthless.

See above.

--

-S
"You know what love really is? It's like you've swallowed a great big
secret. A warm wonderful secret that nobody else knows about." - 'Blame it
on Rio'
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 27, 2005 1:36:16 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> And if a real
> scientist wouldn't consider this worth doing, who are you to suggest
> otherwise?
>


p.s. To forestall ambiguity, when I say "if that is the conclusion
scientists come to I would like to know *how* they know it to be true,"
I am asking "how do they know" not in the sense of how the scientist
comes to be qualified to make such a judgment, or what training he/she
receives, but in the sense of what makes such a belief a justified one.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 28, 2005 4:12:03 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:

>>So how do you get from the premise you cite, which is about very quiet
>>sounds,
>
> No, it's not. It's about just noticeable differences within what may be
> very loud sounds.

What you wrote was,

" Very simply, we can measure signals passing through the aural (otic?)
nerve to the brain. And we can, and have, figured out the quietest
sounds that will trigger a signal to the brain. I presume you will
accept the fact that if something is too quiet to excite the aural
nerve, then the brain cannot react to it in any way.

We've also used listening tests to determine the quietest sounds that
humans can detect. And it turns out that the quietest sounds we can
detect in listening tests are pretty close to the quietest sounds that
can excite the aural nerve. IOW, if you can't hear it in a listening
test, we're on pretty safe ground in assuming that it can't excite the
aural nerve, and therefore that your brain cannot react to it in any
way."

That's about very quiet sounds.

> What do you mean, how do I get there? I'm already there. If you accept
> as fact the idea that DBTs and measurements of nerve reactions give
> similar estimates of JNDs, then the conclusion is a slam-dunk, as
> George Tenet would say.

But now you are saying something else, which is (presumably) that
measurements have been taken up and down the loudness spectrum. How is
the nerve reaction measured in a fine-grained enough way to make sure
the very same information is being transmitted? There are a lot of
neurons in there.

Just to be sure I understand this, you are saying that measurements have
been made that show that if any two signals are indistinguishable
subjectively (because of masking effects, say, or for any other reason),
then the nerve reactions are the *same*, not just by some gross measure
like overall activity, but in the sense that the *very same information*
is being transmitted? Quite interesting.
>
> If you don't accept that as fact, take it up with experts in the field,
> of which I am not one.

Thanks for the info. If you, or anyone, can provide a reference to the
"idea that DBTs and measurements of nerve reactions give similar
estimates of JNDs," (one that is not limited to very very quiet sounds,
and applies to complex sounds) I'd be interested.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 28, 2005 4:22:06 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
>>>> Keith Hughes wrote:
>
>
> <snip>
>
>>>
>>> The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
>>> distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
>>> have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
>>> you've made a distinction between them.
>>
>> I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
>> Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
>> order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
>> than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)
>
> You *cannot* look at it from the outside. That's the point. Karl's
> satisfaction must be apprehended *by him* or it simply does not exist,
> and there is no mechanism by which an "outside" observer can ascertain
> that Karl liked one better than the other. You are trying to create a
> scenario where *your* interpretation of Karls internal reality supplants
> his actual perception, and then base an argument on what you presume
> Karl's response would have been had he had a response. This is fantasy,
> not theoretical supposition.

I think I see where you are coming from, but I don't think your
conclusion follows. You are talking about Karl's satisfaction also, so
you are looking at it from the outside just as much as I am. Moreover,
even if it is true that Karl's sensation does not exist unless he
apprehends it, there can be relational properties his sensation has that
he does not apprehend, for example, occurring 10 minutes earlier than
some other sensation, or having a greater subjective strength than some
other sensation.

It is just false that there is "no mechanism" by which someone else can
tell if a person likes A more than he likes B. One can observe the
person's behavior.

Common sense says that we can have some conception of, and information
about, the mental states of others. Common sense says that if a person
scratches his finger one day, forgets about it, and stubs his toe the
next, the pain on the first occasion is likely to have been less than
the pain on the second occasion. I *think* you are saying that to
suppose this is actually meaningless, on the basis of some sort of
sophisticated philosophical consideration, maybe about the impossibility
of knowing "other minds"? If so, I think that philosophy has led us
astray here. Common sense is right.

One of the writers who I think supports my view of this is Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations. I would say that most
philosophers nowadays would not take such an extreme operationalist view
as you do. Your view, as I understand it, is that it makes no sense to
say sensations A and B enter into a certain relation unless the subject
perceives them as so related, and I think most philosophers would deny that.

>>
>>> You simply cannot enjoy one more
>>> than the other if you think they are identical,
>>
>> There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
>> identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
>> the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
>> more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
>> different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?
>
> This is the same as "the same". Two presentations are the same, or they
> are different. If, for whatever reason, you do not distinguish between
> the two, then for your internal reality, they are the same. You do not
> have to make a conscious evaluation of "sameness", the absence of
> conscious "difference" is the same thing.

So you are saying that if you fail to judge whether A and B are the
same, then you cannot enjoy one more than you enjoy the other? Again,
that just seems to fly in the face of common sense. I enjoy a hamburger
on one occasion, I stub my toe on another, and it never occurs to me to
think of the two together in one thought. I never actually compare
them. You are saying that it's not the case that one was pleasurable
and the other painful? It's not the case that I derived more pleasure
from one than the other? I think that you are possibly being led astray
by theory here!

Failing to judge whether two things are the same or different is,
patently, *not* the same thing as judging them to be the same. Maybe
you think they *ought* to be the same thing, but they're not. And what
is a "presentation," anyway?

>>
>>
>>>> Perhaps, but I was saying that he enjoyed one more than the other, not
>>>> that he knew he did.
>>>
>>>
>>> If he didn't *know* he did, then he didn't. You cannot have greater
>>> enjoyment without a standard of lesser enjoyment to compare to.
>>>
>> That is just false.
>
> Simple logic, and use of English. Greater than...what? Cite one,
> grammatically correct, example of where you can say "X is greater than"
> without supplying a reference quantity.

It is false to say that if he didn't know that he enjoyed one more than
the other, then he didn't enjoy one more than the other. That's because
the logical form of the statement "He enjoyed one more than (he enjoyed)
the other" is, more or less: He enjoyed one thing to degree x; he
enjoyed the other to degree y; and x is greater than y. In the last
clause, x and y do not occur in the scope of "enjoyed" or any other
mental predicate applied to Karl.

Yes, "greater" implies a comparison, but it isn't necessarily a
comparison undertaken by the subject of whom the enjoyment is
predicated. If I understand you right, you are saying that applying a
word like "greater" to Karl's sensations is meaningless unless Karl
makes an actual comparison. But the links between language and direct
observation aren't one-to-one like that.

We make this assumption all the time when we talk about loudness; to say
that one sound is louder than another does not imply that anyone has
actually heard and compared them.

>> To change the example, suppose yesterday Karl scratched his finger
>> slightly. Today he stubbed his toe really hard. Consider the
>> statement
>>
>> * The pain Karl felt on scratching his finger was less than the pain he
>> felt on stubbing his toe.
>
> You *might* make the statement that the neuronal excitation resulting
> from the scratch was less than resulting from the toe stubbing, but you
> cannot interpret, FOR HIM, the relative level of his apprehension of
> pain. Don't confuse level of stimulus with level of perception - while
> they may be proportional at times, at other times, given other physical
> and emotional inputs, they may have no correlation whatsoever.

The statement isn't about neuronal excitation; it's about pain. Exactly
then what are you saying about the status of *? It couldn't be true,
it's not meaningful, I'm not in a position to assert that it's true, no
one can know that it's true; what exactly are you saying about it?

If by "you cannot interpret, FOR HIM, the relative level of his
apprehension of pain" you mean that I'm unable to state a true
proposition of the form "The pain Karl suffered on occasion x was
greater than the pain he suffered on occasion y," that's simply false,
and contrary to common sense. Don't doctors make such judgments all the
time? And don't they compare the pain someone *would* suffer in one
hypothetical situation to the pain they would suffer in another? Here
there is no question of an actual comparison on the patient's part,
since it is possible pains, not actual pains, that are being compared by
the doctor.

>>
>> For * to be true, Karl doesn't have to know it's true or do a
>> comparison. By this morning, let's say for the sake of argument, he'd
>> forgotten all about yesterday.
>>
>> There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and
>> Karl's knowing it to be true.
>
> No, there is not, not when Karls perception is the subject at hand.

Well, I guess we just disagree there. One example would be where Karl
sees a blue color patch (and, as expected, it looks blue to him) but
then forgets what color it was. Now he sees another patch and it also
looks blue. There is the same perceived color, but he doesn't know that
they are the same.

Or Karl's visual experience of the blue patch can last 2 seconds but he
loses track of time. He does not know how long it lasted. (Or would
you say it can last 2 seconds only if he knows that it does?)

> *YOU* do not, cannot, and will never have the capacity by which to judge
> Karl's perception of events. You are trying to project what *you*
> believe to be an absolute level (in this case pain) of response, based
> on *your* personal psychological/physiological makeup, onto Karl and
> assume that holds true for all circumstances. This is untenable.

How does the truth of * has anything to do with *me* or my projections?
It is true independently of whether I exist, certainly.

But I disagree with your claim that people other than Karl never have
the capacity to make true judgments about his perceptual states.
Obviously, there are many cases in which we are in a position to know
things about the perceptions of others. The whole of psychophysics is
founded on that idea.

> You again miss the basic point. No one other than Karl can assess
> whether the scratch or the stubb was more painful. If Karl didn't do it
> (i.e. he didn't compare them), then no comparison was made, and there is
> no objective data to determine his relative response. You can suppose
> all day about what you think his response obviously would have been, but
> that is pointless since *you* cannot know. The severity of the injury is
> not directly proportional to the perception of pain.

This is a different point. The former question was whether something
can be *true* aboue Karl's perceptions without his knowing it. The
present question is whether someone else can be in a position to
"assess" it, i.e., have evidence about it. If Karl screams on one
occasion but not on the other, that is one kind of evidence that another
person can have. And it is well known that certain kinds of injuries
are more painful than others, with various exceptions that are also
known. So very often people *are* in a position to assess these things.
>>
>>
>> We are taking a third-person perspective. To stick with the
>> toe-stubbing example, it is we who grasp the thought that one episode
>> is more painful than the other, not Karl.
>
>
> This is ludicrous. *We* cannot grasp the internal response of another
> person. We can question that individual and determine their response,
> but when they have none (as in your example), it is pure fantasy to say
> *we know what Karl felt, even though he doesn't*. You're using Karls
> perception on the one hand to prove your point, while on the other hand
> you're saying Karls perception is irrelevant because *we* know what it
> was whether he peceived it or not.

No, I wouldn't say that "we know what Karl felt, even though he
doesn't," because, even if we know that one pain was greater than
another, that isn't something he felt, because he didn't make the
comparison. What we would know in that case is a proposition, *that*
the pain experienced in one case was greater than the pain experienced
in the other, but, by hypothesis, he didn't feel *that* the pain was
greater.

What we would know in that case is a fact *about* his perceptions.

As far as the claim that "we cannot grasp the internal response of
another person" is concerned, it depends what you mean, but in general
we do have a pretty robust conception of the mental lives of others.
Babies develop that along with everything else, and psychologists track
some of the ways. For discussion of the whole issue, Wittgenstein is
quite valuable and I recommend him; also Gilbert Ryle and Norman Malcolm.

>>>> It can be a fact that I enjoyed one more than I enjoyed
>>>> the other even though no comparison took place. (I enjoyed one to
>>>> degree x, I enjoyed the other to degree y, and x is greater than y.)
>>>
>>>
>>> But of course, you do not know this - the point you seem to be missing
>>> here. Maybe both were X, maybe both were Y. If you cannot identify, let
>>> alone quantify, what X is, you cannot determine that another experience
>>> is "Y"...it might just as well be "X".

For it to be a fact is one thing, for someone to know it is another, and
the operational definition or "criterion," if there is one in the first
place, need not be restricted to the subject's actual comparison but can
include other behavior also.

Philosophical behaviorism, which to some extent received inspiration
from Wittgenstein, acknowledges that you can't "peer into the mind" of
another person to feel the pain directly, but argues that the concept of
pain or other mental states is logically tied to behavior. (But a wider
range of behavior than you seem to want to allow.)

>>
>> Again, there is a difference between what we, on the outside looking
>> in, are specifying to be the case,
>
>
> The fallacy in a nutshell. You specify Karls response (separate from any
> perception that Karl may have) and then use that to as though it were
> actual data, to support your position.

I'm just saying "suppose one pain was greater than another"; what the
data or evidence would be for this is an important question, but I don't
understand what you mean when you say I'm using the supposition "as" data.

Look, is what I'm describing really so unusual? Karl hears a long,
involved musical passage. Psychoacousticians would say (yes?) that each
of the notes in the passage has a certain loudness (for him,
subjectively). So, the fifth note has a certain loudness. The
twentieth note has a certain loudness. Oh, but wait, Karl has no idea
if the fifth note was louder than the twentieth note or vice versa. So
I guess we have to go back and reject the idea that each note had a
certain degree of loudness. That seems quite implausible, but it
follows from your view, no?
>
>> and what the subject being described
>> is aware of. That can get confusing if the example is put in the first
>> person (as I had it), so let's stick with Karl! :-)
>
>
> Not confusing at all. Just illogical. You once again want to stipulate
> that Karl has perceptual responses that A) he does not know about, and
> B) about events does not remember, and C) we on the outside nonetheless
> know the internal perceptual response he had but was unaware of.

A) There can be facts *about* Karl's perceptions that he does not know
to be true.
B) He can have perceived something and not remember it (common sense).
C) I am saying that we can know facts about Karl's perceptions that he
does not himself know. For instance, suppose he sees a succession of
color flashes. Did he see red or blue first? He may not know that now,
or may never have known it, but we may know.

> If Karl is unaware of it of a perception, then he *DID NOT HAVE IT*.

A dubious principle: suppose he has forgotten. Then he is unaware of it
now. So he never had it? Contrary to common sense.

> It is not a perception if he is unaware of it - that's sort of the hallmark of
> perception.

There is a difference between being aware of the object that is
presented in perception and knowing everything that is true about the
perception.

> Your whole argument is based on this fallacy; that we can
> assume Karl had a perception that he didn't know about, and proceed from
> there to create causes and relationships for differential perceptions
> that he didn't have.

You make it sound as if I'm saying that he had a perceptual experience
without knowing, at the time, that he was having one, whereas I'm merely
saying that he need not know everything about his perceptions. And the
proposition that one pain is greater than another is not a perception.


> The objective reality is that Karl perceives an event, or he does not.
> We're not talking about Newtonian physics here, we're talking about
> *perception*. You can't talk about the perception that Karl was unaware
> of - without awareness there was no perception. If your postulate
> requires Karl to have serial perceptions of which he is unaware or can't
> remember, the lack of utility seems obvious.

There is a distinction between (a) Karl being unaware of his perception,
or its object, at the time he had it and (b) his not being aware of some
fact about it, either then or at some later time. There are perhaps two
senses of "aware" floating around here: being aware of some perceivable
quality and being aware *that* something is the case, i.e., being aware
of some fact. I am saying he can have a perception without being aware
of every fact about it, everything that is true about it.

>> This is an extreme form of reductionism, or
>> verificationism, or operationalism.
>
>
> No, just an awareness of how perception is not always coupled to
> externally observable reality. Perception is dependent on the peculiar
> cognitive processes of the individual under study, and can vary by
> orders of magnitude as the test conditions (including subject
> conditions) are varied.

Your view, if I understand it, is an extreme form of operationalism
because you want to link everything we understand to be true about a
mental state to a very narrow set of operations performed by the
subject. Notions of perceptual states have logical connections to a lot
more things than that, e.g., other sorts of behavior.

> You're trying to pretend that everyone perceives
> a given stimulus in an identical fashion, under all circumstances.


No.


>> Surely, at the very least, we can
>> have evidence that Pain 1 is greater than Pain 2 in other ways, for
>> example, by measuring the force of the impact on the toe,
>
>
> We can monitor the stimulus, certainly. We cannot extrapolate from that
> what Karls perception will be.

Well, if you mean we can never have a justified belief about what level
of pain Karl will experience based on the knowledge about the stimulus
and Karl's physiological state, that's just false. We know a lot about
what stimuli are correlated with what levels of pain.

In a parallel way, we know a lot about how intensity levels are related
to loudness. It can be a fact that the perceived loudness of one sound
to a person is greater or less than the perceived loudness of another
sound, and this will be true whether or not the person actually compares
them.

Sure, if we cut off his arm *we* know
> that will hurt more than breaking his toe. But for your argument to have
> any legs (pun intented) we have to pretend that Karl forgot about the
> broken toe and the severed arm. Not going to happen.

In a situation like that, it is more likely that he will experience the
levels of pain he does without thinking of any comparison, and they will
be what they are, and it will be a fact that they are the same or
different, or close or far apart, independent of whether he realizes
that they are.

>
>> noting
>> whether Karl says "Ow!" etc.
>
>
> He says "Ow" both times. What did we learn?

Nothing, try again.

>>
>>>> ... I am talking about discrimination of
>>>> the kind where you have to say if A is the same as B.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, I'm confused. You agree that saying the ability to identify one
>>> system as a "9" and another as a "2" (relative to any parameter of
>>> interest) demonstrates the ability to discriminate between them, but
>>> that's different than being able to tell if they are the same??????
>>
>>
>>
>> There are two relevant kinds of tasks. One involves listening to
>> sources A and B and judging if they are the same or different. The
>> other involves rating (say) how much you like a given source.
>>
>> I am saying I do not see how these tasks are equivalent. There can be
>> memory effects that play a role in one but not the other.
>
>
> OK, since you seem analogy driven, how can you say that you like an
> Outback steak more than a Big Mac if you can't tell them apart?

You can say that if, say, you can tell them apart following one protocol
but not another. There might be one kind of test where you can tell
them apart, another where you can't.

>
>> I do agree with you that both can aptly be called "discrimination," but
>> I had been using that term to mean the first of the two kinds. Maybe
>> "same/different judgment" would be a better term.
>
>
> You're trying to use semantics to create an illusion of difference, and
> it doesn't wash. No matter how you cut it, if you have a preference, you
> have judged "different", or you lack the capacity for logic.

A subject may indeed react differently to two stimuli without judging
that they are different. There is a difference between being illogical
and failing to be logically omniscient. You may argue that if a person
reacts differently to A and B then, if he fails to judge that they are
different, he has failed to follow through on a logical inference he
should make. But that is not quite the same as being illogical. The
axioms of arithmetic have lots of logical implications we are not aware
of, but our failure to be aware of all of those implications means we
are not logically omniscient, not that we are illogical.

>> Moreover, the outcome of a "rating" test need not (as far as I can see)
>> correspond exactly to that of a "same/different judgment" test. If
>> Karl gives higher ratings to A than B in the first sort of testing
>> protocol,
>
>
> If he does it blind, and level matched, and can achieve statistically
> valid results, then he can indeed tell them apart. If it's not
> reproducible, then the test means nothing, and the whole thing is moot.
>
>> does it follow that, in the second sort of test, if he
>> listens first to A then B, he will be able to judge correctly whether
>> they are the same?
>
>
> Yes, it does. *If* he meets the criteria detailed above.
>
>> I don't see why.
>
>
> I'm aware. How is this different? Answer...it's not. All Karl has to do
> is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above. He say's to himself, "Hmmmm, I
> like A better than B, logic dictates that they must be different". And
> he's already shown he can decide which he likes better. It is a matter
> of the most rudimetary logic to extrapolate the "I like A more than B"
> to A is different than B.

Sure, replicate one kind of test within the other! Give Karl a pencil
and paper, replicate the ratings test within the same/different
protocol, and all will be well. But you have illustrated my point. The
way the same/different test is set up, it's not likely that Karl will do
this, nor is he encouraged to do this. Karl's attention is focused
differently in the two tests; the demands are different. We are talking
about two different psychological experiments, and the mechanisms a
subject will employ in following their instructions are likely to be
different, even if it would be possible for someone, bending over
backwards, to satisfy one protocol by performing the other.

Nobody in psychology thinks that experimental outcomes will be dictated
by logical omniscience, or even an adherence to logic, on the part of
the subject. Look at Kahneman and Tversky's demonstration of how
people's utilities are often illogical.

> ...just don't snip the part about supposing a set of
> results, while stipulating a methodology that precludes any chance of
> achieving those results, and then pretending that the method has rigor.

Sorry if you felt I should retain this in the quotations (so here it is)
but if you take me to have "stipulated" a methodology that is consistent
with some "results" I have "supposed," and then to have engaged in some
sort of pretense, then possibly what you have represented is not quite
my position.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 28, 2005 4:23:17 AM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
> > There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
> > identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
> > the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
> > more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
> > different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?
>
> This is the same as "the same". Two presentations are the same, or they
> are different.

Concerning your notion of a presentation, I would be interested in your
views about the following.

1. You say one presentation is either the same as or different from
another. It would seem a plausible principle that presentations are
different just in case the corresponding stimuli are discriminable. It
would also seem plausible that sameness of presentation is transitive,
i.e., if presentation x is the same as presentation y, and if y is the
same as z, then x is the same as z. (This is a special case of the
transitivity of identity.)

However, there are cases where, when you compare stimulus A with
stimulus B, you cannot tell them apart, and you cannot tell B from C,
but you can tell A from C. In this case it would follow from the above
principles that the presentation corresponding to A, call it pA, is the
same as the presentation corresponding to B, or pB, and pB is the same
as pC, but pA is not the same as pC. But then transitivity fails.

> If, for whatever reason, you do not distinguish between
> the two, then for your internal reality, they are the same. You do not
> have to make a conscious evaluation of "sameness", the absence of
> conscious "difference" is the same thing.

2. Suppose you listen to a melody. You perceive each note as, among
other things, having a certain pitch. Suppose note i (say, the 5th
note) of the melody is E and note j (the 17th note) is F. You are
asked if notes i and j have the same pitch (say they are indicated by
light flashes in the course of the melody). Not being a trained
musician, you can't tell. From what you say, it appears to follow
that, on this occasion, you perceive the notes as having the *same*
pitch. They are the same "in your internal reality." This seems quite
counterintuitive. And it would seem to follow from your principle that
the average person hears many of the notes of a melody as being the
same, even when they aren't, since there is an "absence of conscious
'difference'" with many arbitrary pairs of nonconsecutive notes.

Moreover, say you can't tell if note i is the same as note k (the 18th
note) of the melody, but you can tell that note j is not the same as
note k (because they occur in succession). Then by your principle, the
presentation of note i = the presentation of note j, and the
presentation of note i = the presentation of note k, but the
presentation of note j is distinct from the presentation of note k.
Again a failure of transitivity.

It is a well established notion in the psychology of music, as well as
common coin, that listeners perceive pitch in the course of hearing a
melody. If your principle about discrimination and sameness of
presentation were true, however, there would be no need for ear
training.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:33:23 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 26 Jul 2005 00:39:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
> wrote:
>
>
>>nabob33@hotmail.com wrote:
>>
>>>Mark DeBellis wrote:
>>>
>>>>Actually ... you were explaining to me how we know that when sounds
>>>>can't be discriminated from one another, the signals travelling in the
>>>>auditory nerve are the same, but the explanation didn't get past sounds
>>>>that are just over the audible threshold. That's not exactly "reasons
>>>>given over and over and over again."
>>>
>>>Well, I'm not responsible for the fact that you don't know enough of
>>>the basic science here to understand what's been explained to you over
>>>and over again. We are, in all cases, talking about sounds that are
>>>"just over the audible threshold." It doesn't matter whether the
>>>context in which we hear that just noticeable difference (JND) is
>>>background noise or something louder and more complex. It's still a
>>>JND, and it's still "just over the audible threshold."
>>
>>So how do you get from the premise you cite, which is about very quiet
>>sounds, to the conclusion that whenever sounds can't be discriminated
>
>>from one another, the signals travelling in the auditory nerve must be
>
>>the same?
>
>
> That's not a commutative statement. What was said was that, if there's
> no difference in the nerve impulse, it's *impossible* for there to be
> an audible difference. If all cats are black, that doesn't make all
> black animals cats.

Bob's claim was "if you can't hear it in a listening test, we're on
pretty safe ground in assuming that it can't excite the aural nerve, and
therefore that your brain cannot react to it in any way."[1] In other
words, if there is no audible difference, then there is no difference in
the nerve impulse. That's the converse of what you said was said.

>
> Because he thinks logically? If it's a given that he can't
> discriminate the two stimuli, there is simply no interest in testing
> him, it would be a priori a waste of time.

Logic does not tell us that what can be discriminated in one situation
can always be discriminated in another.

> Statistics.

Ah, so it has been studied and reported on? I would be interested in a
reference.

Mark

[1] Mon, Jul 11 2005 9:51 pm, Message-ID:
<dav7ma01j52@news2.newsguy.com>, Date: 12 Jul 2005 01:51:06 GMT
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:36:25 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 26 Jul 2005 00:48:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
> wrote:
>
>
>>Keith Hughes wrote:
>>

>>
>>We are taking a third-person perspective. To stick with the
>>toe-stubbing example, it is we who grasp the thought that one episode
>>is more painful than the other, not Karl.
>>
>>It's not irrelevant because we are talking about problems of comparison
>>of longer excerpts.
>
>
> Sure it's irrelevant. How do *you* know how Karl feels pain? You make
> a classic scientific error. He may have damaged nerves in his toe and
> feel little sensation.

> You are *assuming* something about the
> *perception* of another person.

Just to clarify where we are in the argument, I am defending a skeptical
position: I am saying for all I know, somebody, call him Karl, could be
unable to distinguish two sources in a same/different discrimination
test and yet derive greater pleasure in normal listening from one source
than the other.

And I am asking, what is the evidence that that isn't possible?

So it is no part of my claim that I *know* that Karl derives greater
pleasure from one source than another (or, in the example that serves as
an analogy, feels greater pain). What I am saying is that nothing, as
far as I know, rules it out, and if you think there is something that
does then I would like to know what it is, to understand how and why it
rules it out.

You imply that it is a mistake to "assume" something about the
perception of another person. But, when you presuppose that having
damaged nerves may cause a loss of sensation, isn't that precisely what
you do?

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:44:58 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Steven Sullivan wrote:

>
> > No comparative or evaluative listening can be "scientific", simply
> > because one is listening to one or the other at one moment, comparing
> > that to the memory of the other.
>
> That will be astonishing and certainly paradigm-changing news to the
> scientific fields of perceptual psychology in general and psychoacoustics
> in particular. I urge you to publish your findings in a peer-reviewed
> journal ASAP.

I think you would agree what is being 'studied' is merely people's
accounts of what they remember they think they heard...

It is merely an oral report of the subject's experience, when he is
asked to compare in his memory the sounds of two different items...

What's being 'tested' (if anything) is his aural memory...NOT his
hearing acuity...

The test is therefore scientifically invalid, as it does not test
hearing as such...

>
> > In other words, ABX testing is no more valuable than long-term
> > evaluation. It is scientifically worthless.
>
> See above.
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:46:24 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 26 Jul 2005 00:48:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
> wrote:
>
> >The principal value of thought exercises is to exercise thought, and I
> >don't think that's at all irrelevant to understanding. (I think we
> >agree about a lot, but diverge on the claim, "You cannot just say
> >'well, OK but just *suppose* ....'" Why can't I say that?)
>
> You can certainly say it. What you can *not* do is have any reasonable
> expectation that anyone will take you seriously.

If you don't take me seriously, whether that's significant to me will
depend on why you don't. I'm happy to know the reasons, and I'm sure
I'd have a lot to learn from them. However, if you don't take my idea
seriously because of a principle like, "If such-and-such is true about
a person's perception, then necessarily the person knows that it's
true," that's a dubious principle.

Suppose you go to a baseball game and you hear the Star Spangled
Banner. Say it is played in the standard way; there are no wrong
notes; you are attentive to it; you are an average, not musically
trained, listener and do not have perfect pitch; and everything else
about the situation is normal.

You will hear each note of the melody as having a particular pitch.
That is, for each note, there will be some pitch such that you hear the
note as having that pitch. So, in particular, there is some pitch x
such that you will hear the 2nd note of the melody as having the pitch
x, and there is some pitch y such that you will hear the 10th note of
the melody as having the pitch y.

In a normal situation, the pitch of the 2nd note is the same as the
pitch of the 10th note (at least approximately). Moreover, your
hearing is normal, so the pitch you hear each note as having is (at
least approximately) the pitch it actually has. So x = y. In other
words, the following will be true:

(1) The pitch you hear the 2nd note as having = the pitch you hear the
10th note as having.

That will be something true about your perception.

Since you are a normal listener, however, you are apt not to know that
(1) is true. You are apt to know this only if you know that the
pitches of the two notes are the same, and normally a person has to
take an ear training course to be able to tell this. (Even then, the
person has to listen for it.)

This is a counterexample to the idea that something can be true about
your perception only if you know it to be true.

So if that's a principle on the basis of which you don't take my
suggestion about audio tests seriously, it's not much of a reason.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:47:24 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
> On 26 Jul 2005 00:48:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
> wrote:
> >
> >There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
> >identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
> >the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
> >more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
> >different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?
>
> What if he doesn't care? What if *we* don't care?

Not sure I understand your question, but I thought this group was in
part about something called the objectivist/subjectivist debate, and
it's not irrelevant to spell out the basic assumptions behind the
views. For what it's worth, I'm trying to articulate the anti-ABX
intuition. It's basically that one source (e.g., SACD) can have a
subtly different psychological effect than another (e.g., CD) on a
given listener, even if he cannot discriminate them in a test in which
the question is "do these sound the same or different?" And I am
interested to know what the objectivist response to that should be.
It's surely *not* "that's an incoherent suggestion, because a person's
perceptions cannot be different unless he knows them to be different,"
because that claim relies on a confusion between what information is
presented in perception and what things are true *about* the
perception. If the shorthand answer is "statistics,"[1] I would be
grateful for a reference so I can see what sort of data you are talking
about, what sorts of experiments you mean and *how* the statistics get
us to your conclusion. Likewise, if I may refer here to someone else's
postings, I appreciate Bob's explanation of the matter in terms of JNDs
and neural signals, but I think it raises further questions and again a
reference would be helpful, something that affords a fuller technical
knowledge and understanding than I have been able to achieve so far.

So that's why we should care, because we're trying to articulate basic
assumptions.

Mark

[1] Message-ID: <dc5ucl01jio@news4.newsguy.com>, Date: 26 Jul 2005
18:11:33 GMT
Local: Tues,Jul 26 2005 2:11 pm. Footnote per group guidelines.
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 29, 2005 7:48:40 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Keith Hughes wrote:
> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>
> >>>Keith Hughes wrote:
>
> <snip>
> >>
> >>The minute you say "from one source than he does another", a
> >>distinction, or differentiation more accurately, is implicit. If you
> >>have a different reaction, or degree of reaction, to A vs. B, then
> >>you've made a distinction between them.
> >
> >
> > I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
> > Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
> > order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
> > than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)
>
> You *cannot* look at it from the outside. That's the point. Karl's
> satisfaction must be apprehended *by him* or it simply does not exist ...

There is a difference between (1) a similarity between perceptions and
(2) the perception of a similarity.

The information presented in one perception might be the same as the
information presented in another, but it is a further mental operation
to determine *that* they are the same information. That they are the
same is, typically, further information, not already contained in
either perception.

It is one thing for the loudness of sound A to be the same as the
loudness of sound B; it is another thing for the subject to perceive
them *as* the same, or to perceive *that* the sounds have the same
loudness. The latter is more difficult to do the more the sounds are
separated in time.

Mark
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 31, 2005 7:18:52 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> Not sure I understand your question, but I thought this group was in
> part about something called the objectivist/subjectivist debate,

No, it's not. It's a discussion of audio reproduction. This
objective/subjective nonsense (and it is nonsense, because real experts
in the field of psychoacoustics do not even think about it) only comes
up when a subjectivist like you makes some preposterously
pseudo-scientific statement and gets called on it. We'd all be much
happier if that never happened.

> and
> it's not irrelevant to spell out the basic assumptions behind the
> views. For what it's worth, I'm trying to articulate the anti-ABX
> intuition.

Thanks. RAHE's been missing that.

> It's basically that one source (e.g., SACD) can have a
> subtly different psychological effect than another (e.g., CD) on a
> given listener, even if he cannot discriminate them in a test in which
> the question is "do these sound the same or different?" And I am
> interested to know what the objectivist response to that should be.
> It's surely *not* "that's an incoherent suggestion, because a person's
> perceptions cannot be different unless he knows them to be different,"
> because that claim relies on a confusion between what information is
> presented in perception and what things are true *about* the
> perception. If the shorthand answer is "statistics,"[1] I would be
> grateful for a reference so I can see what sort of data you are talking
> about, what sorts of experiments you mean and *how* the statistics get
> us to your conclusion. Likewise, if I may refer here to someone else's
> postings, I appreciate Bob's explanation of the matter in terms of JNDs
> and neural signals, but I think it raises further questions and again a
> reference would be helpful, something that affords a fuller technical
> knowledge and understanding than I have been able to achieve so far.
>
> So that's why we should care, because we're trying to articulate basic
> assumptions.

Some of us are quite frankly tired of articulating basic assumptions,
especially to people who want to argue with us without even trying to
understand the subject they are arguing about. This is not a newsgroup
about scientific research. If it's scientific research you want, I
suggest you go find some scientists.

I and others have tried to give you a basic layman's understanding of
why psychoacousticians rely on the kinds of tests they rely on, and
hence why those tests have a general applicability that would certainly
extend to such minor questions as amp and cable sound. It appears to me
that your mistaken preconceptions about these subjects is interfering
with your ability to engage and understand what we're trying to say to
you. I will suggest again that you avail yourself of the resources of a
nearby institution of higher education, and come back when you want to
talk about audio.

bob
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 31, 2005 7:27:49 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> Keith Hughes wrote:
>
>>Mark DeBellis wrote:
>>
>>
>>>>>Keith Hughes wrote:
>>
<snip>

>>>
>>>I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
>>>Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
>>>order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
>>>than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)
>>
>>You *cannot* look at it from the outside. That's the point. Karl's
>>satisfaction must be apprehended *by him* or it simply does not exist ...
>
>
> There is a difference between (1) a similarity between perceptions and
> (2) the perception of a similarity.

Precisely.

>
> The information presented in one perception might be the same as the
> information presented in another, but it is a further mental operation
> to determine *that* they are the same information.

How can you understand that without understanding its significance to
the subject at hand, i.e. having a basis for establishing a preference,
or a differential 'satisfaction' response? *Karl*, not you or I, must
perform that further mental operation (i.e. comparison/differentiation
as we've been discussing all along) or he cannot have any basis for
preference.

I'll ask you once again: cite a single example of how a preference can
be established, or a differentiation made, without a comparison of the
form X vs. Y.

This is the crux of the argument you refuse to understand. You want to
formulate all sorts of analogies to try and create an illusion that
somehow a preference doesn't need to have a same / different
identification as its basis. But you cannot cite one example of how that
could happen can you?

Take a look at the etymology of "prefer" or "differentiate", you'll see
that they are *predicated* on identification of difference. Look at the
etymology of "satisfaction" and you'll find that, in this context, it is
a measure of pleasure or contentment. Thus to have greater satisfaction
from A than B directly connotes a preference for B, which again requires
differentiation.

> That they are the
> same is, typically, further information, not already contained in
> either perception.

Yes indeed. You cannot process that information, only Karl can. Karl
didn't, so Karl can't differentiate, and thus Karl cannot have a
preference. Karl did not compare, so Karl does not know if he had more
satisfaction from A or B, and *you* as the external observer cannot
perform that task for him. You lack the requisite data, or at the very
least, lack an observational tool *of sufficient precision* with which
to make that determination.

>
> It is one thing for the loudness of sound A to be the same as the
> loudness of sound B; it is another thing for the subject to perceive
> them *as* the same, or to perceive *that* the sounds have the same
> loudness.

If by "loudness" you mean decibel level, then this is not news. Can a
10hz 80db sound be perceived differently than a 10khz sound at 80db? Of
course - just physiology. If, however, by "loudness" you mean the
perception of loudness then your statement is wrong, by definition.

> The latter is more difficult to do the more the sounds are
> separated in time.

Exactly so, although the data suggests 'impossible' is more accurate
than 'more difficult'. Which of course is why your "Karl perceived long
ago but forgot" analogy so conspicuously fails. Your analogies all rely
on suppositions of what could happen if the test were conducted as
poorly as humanly possible. Or rely on phenomenological parsing.

Does it not strike you as an act of desperation to resort to imagining
ways a test could be conducted incorrectly to achieve the results you
want? Or that you must resort to phenomenology, which while it *may* be
relevant to perception in general, has no utility when the suject is the
linkage of perception *to* objective reality? It strikes me so.

Keith Hughes
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 31, 2005 7:28:39 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
> Steven Sullivan wrote:

> >
> > > No comparative or evaluative listening can be "scientific", simply
> > > because one is listening to one or the other at one moment, comparing
> > > that to the memory of the other.
> >
> > That will be astonishing and certainly paradigm-changing news to the
> > scientific fields of perceptual psychology in general and psychoacoustics
> > in particular. I urge you to publish your findings in a peer-reviewed
> > journal ASAP.

> I think you would agree what is being 'studied' is merely people's
> accounts of what they remember they think they heard...

Do you agree that comparative listening is the basis of many, many
*scientific* studies of and conclusions about psychoacoustics extant in
the *scientific* literature over the past century or so?

> It is merely an oral report of the subject's experience, when he is
> asked to compare in his memory the sounds of two different items...

> What's being 'tested' (if anything) is his aural memory...NOT his
> hearing acuity...

> The test is therefore scientifically invalid, as it does not test
> hearing as such...

Your sophistry is noted -- but the practicing scientists
of the world will, alas be unconvinced by it, I fear.

A DBT of a claim of difference is a test of 'hearing acuity'
only to the extent that it tests whether the 'hearing' on which
the claim of difference is based, was real at all. Remember
that the subject *already claims* to hear
a difference -- the 'acuity' is already established to that extent.
If the subject claims to hear no difference, there's nothing to test.

It is *not* a test of whether, with more training, a subject might
begin to reliably hear a difference...though it could be, if the
goal is to discern whether a difference exists, or at what level
a real difference is discernable. In psychoacoustic
studies, this is often the case, and thus training is often
involved.

--

-S
"You know what love really is? It's like you've swallowed a great big
secret. A warm wonderful secret that nobody else knows about." - 'Blame it
on Rio'
Anonymous
a b } Memory
July 31, 2005 7:33:45 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

Mark DeBellis wrote:
> Keith Hughes wrote:
>
>> Mark DeBellis wrote:
>>
>>>>> Keith Hughes wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> <snip>

>>> I am making a distinction, looking at the situation from outside, but
>>> Karl need not have a view about whether he liked A better than B in
>>> order for it to be the case that he derived greater pleasure from one
>>> than the other. (I'll say more about this below.)
>>
>>
>> You *cannot* look at it from the outside. That's the point. Karl's
>> satisfaction must be apprehended *by him* or it simply does not exist,
>> and there is no mechanism by which an "outside" observer can ascertain
>> that Karl liked one better than the other. You are trying to create a
>> scenario where *your* interpretation of Karls internal reality
>> supplants his actual perception, and then base an argument on what you
>> presume Karl's response would have been had he had a response. This is
>> fantasy, not theoretical supposition.
>
>
> I think I see where you are coming from, but I don't think your
> conclusion follows.

> You are talking about Karl's satisfaction also, so
> you are looking at it from the outside just as much as I am.

If you actually believe that statement, you clearly have misunderstood
*everything* I've said. YES I'm talking about Karls satisfaction, but
I'm saying that neither You, nor I, nor anyone on the outside can
possibly quantify his satisfaction. How can that possibly be construed
as "looking at it from the outside just as much as I am" ???

*IF* you could objectively measure his satisfaction, if would have to be
contemporaneous with each presentation, on a scale that would be
repeatable *for Karl*, so you could compare the two levels. This is
completely contrary to the scenario you proposed.

> Moreover,
> even if it is true that Karl's sensation does not exist unless he
> apprehends it, there can be relational properties his sensation has that
> he does not apprehend, for example, occurring 10 minutes earlier than
> some other sensation, or having a greater subjective strength than some
> other sensation.

False premise. There can be no relational properties to non-existant
perceptions. Just exactly *what* would the susequent perceptions relate to?

>
> It is just false that there is "no mechanism" by which someone else can
> tell if a person likes A more than he likes B. One can observe the
> person's behavior.

Which is irrelevant in the extreme to your use of "Karl" in the first
place. You're using Karls perception to support your argument. When the
question arises as to whether Karls perception could be as you want to
stipulate, given the constraints of the rest of the scenario, you then
want to create a whole observational layer wherein you can say "well we
can observe Karls behaviour to tell what he thinks even if he doesn't
know it himself". Karl is the one who has to be able to tell two
presentations apart (or verify sameness) to have relevance to the
subject of audio tests. In a partial loudness test, for e.g., you can
measure response, from the outside, but your basis for "Karl" was
relative to satisfaction.

Now we can either measure Karl's response in two time proximate
presentations, where memory plays a minor role (remember *satisfaction*,
not aural memory), but where observation of response obviated by the
ability to simply question Karl directly. So here you through in the
red-herring of the "suppose the first presentation was last year, and he
forgot, he still had two different levels of satisfaction". Well, for
that we can say:

1. You can't compare responses (even if you had a valid methodology)
because the first presentation was before the start of the comparison
test, ergo useless.
2. To purposely design such a test would be an example of abject
incompetence.

> Common sense says that we can have some conception of,

Absolutely. Thanks for clarifying the issue. Since when does "some
conception of" connote sufficient precision such that an observer could
determine the relative enjoyment a subject experience between
Presentation A and Presentation B, when A and B are very similar (if
not, the test would be pointless)?

> and information
> about, the mental states of others. Common sense says that if a person
> scratches his finger one day, forgets about it, and stubs his toe the
> next, the pain on the first occasion is likely to have been less than
> the pain on the second occasion.

*Only* if the persons mental state is the same. You don't know that.

> I *think* you are saying that to
> suppose this is actually meaningless, on the basis of some sort of
> sophisticated philosophical consideration,

Uhmm...you brough philosophy into this discussion, not I, with your
reference to the objective reality of Karls perceptions that exists
outside of his apprehension of those perceptions.

> maybe about the impossibility
> of knowing "other minds"? If so, I think that philosophy has led us
> astray here. Common sense is right.

Common sense is indeed right...it does not, however, support your
position. Common sense suggests that when comparing someones response to
different stimuli, the stimuli are presented in a time proximate manner
to minimize affective variations in the person tested. Changes that
could skew the data. Common sense then tells us that if that approach
doesn't support our argument, we don't then generate suppositions about
what would happen if we stipulated that the test be done wrongly
(time-distal presentations) and further that the subject can't remember
the first presentation, and then postulate that there is some objective
truth of perception that has an existance outside of the perceivers
awareness that we *could* have measured. Common sense would say you
construct the test correctly, and quit speculating about what
could/would/might happen if it were done incorrectly.

> One of the writers who I think supports my view of this is Ludwig
> Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations. I would say that most
> philosophers nowadays would not take such an extreme operationalist view
> as you do. Your view, as I understand it, is that it makes no sense to
> say sensations A and B enter into a certain relation unless the subject
> perceives them as so related

Exactly correct *when the test relies on the subject making that
distinction*. How hard is that to understand?

, and I think most philosophers would deny
> that.

Well, to that I would say A) philosophy is not concerned with collection
of objective data, and B) that you say "most philosophers" means you
recognize that differing, educated, opinions exists.

>> This is the same as "the same". Two presentations are the same, or
>> they are different. If, for whatever reason, you do not distinguish
>> between the two, then for your internal reality, they are the same.
>> You do not have to make a conscious evaluation of "sameness", the
>> absence of conscious "difference" is the same thing.
>
>
> So you are saying that if you fail to judge whether A and B are the
> same, then you cannot enjoy one more than you enjoy the other?

Try to stay in context, things make more sense. If you fail to judge
whether A and B are the same, then you did not judge whether you enjoyed
one more than the other, and your result, relative to an audio test is
the same as if you determined them to be the same, i.e. you did not
discern a difference.

> Again,
> that just seems to fly in the face of common sense. I enjoy a hamburger
> on one occasion, I stub my toe on another, and it never occurs to me to
> think of the two together in one thought. I never actually compare
> them. You are saying that it's not the case that one was pleasurable
> and the other painful?

Methinks your penchant for analogies somewhat outstrips your talent in
creating relevance. You continue to range far afield from anything
remotely resembling the context of the disussion. A more accurate, but
no more relevant, analogy would be stubbing your toe *while eating the
burger*. The two perceptions are time-proximate, and common sense says
you would clearly differentiate them, not as "the burger was more
pleasurable than the toe stub", but as having a pleasurable experience
interrupted by an unpleasureable one. Clearly remembering the
distinction would prove trivial, or do you want to now suppose what
would happen if you forgot one?

<snip>
>>
>> Simple logic, and use of English. Greater than...what? Cite one,
>> grammatically correct, example of where you can say "X is greater
>> than" without supplying a reference quantity.
>
>
> It is false to say that if he didn't know that he enjoyed one more than
> the other, then he didn't enjoy one more than the other. That's because
> the logical form of the statement "He enjoyed one more than (he enjoyed)
> the other" is, more or less: He enjoyed one thing to degree x; he
> enjoyed the other to degree y; and x is greater than y.

Clearly inaccurate. You're assuming one has to assign a magnitude to
each of two quantities to compare same or different. One only has to be
able to juxtapose the two entities for comparison.

> In the last
> clause, x and y do not occur in the scope of "enjoyed" or any other
> mental predicate applied to Karl.

Again, wrong conclusion from wrong premise.
>
> Yes, "greater" implies a comparison, but it isn't necessarily a
> comparison undertaken by the subject of whom the enjoyment is
> predicated.

It *must* be if the suject is making the distinction.

> If I understand you right, you are saying that applying a
> word like "greater" to Karl's sensations is meaningless unless Karl
> makes an actual comparison.

Yes that's basically true. Remember the context! If Karl doesn't make
the comparison (we're talking satisfaction remember, not an objective
quantity you can measure) then no one else can.

> But the links between language and direct
> observation aren't one-to-one like that.

If you believe this, then you might as well stop trying to communicate.
The language(s) has been derived for the sole purpose of communicating
objective data (and later, subjective data - but that's still a bit
murky IMO). Comparison has a clearly understood meaning, and you cannot
have a comparison between ONE 'thing'. Clearly, you need to compare one
'thing' with another 'thing'. Again, point to *ONE* instance where this
is not the case, any field, any parameter, anything at all.

> We make this assumption all the time when we talk about loudness; to say
> that one sound is louder than another does not imply that anyone has
> actually heard and compared them.

You're confusion objectively measured reality with assumption. When we
talk about loudness, we know *exactly* what objective, real world
phenomenon we're discussion. We're assuming nothing. That you believe
this to be assumption is illuminating.

>> You *might* make the statement that the neuronal excitation resulting
>> from the scratch was less than resulting from the toe stubbing, but
>> you cannot interpret, FOR HIM, the relative level of his apprehension
>> of pain. Don't confuse level of stimulus with level of perception -
>> while they may be proportional at times, at other times, given other
>> physical and emotional inputs, they may have no correlation whatsoever.
>
>
> The statement isn't about neuronal excitation; it's about pain.

You need to read more carefully. The point is you cannot measure pain
directly, but you *could* measure neuronal excitation as an indicator.

> Exactly
> then what are you saying about the status of *?
> It couldn't be true,
> it's not meaningful, I'm not in a position to assert that it's true, no
> one can know that it's true; what exactly are you saying about it?

See above.

> If by "you cannot interpret, FOR HIM, the relative level of his
> apprehension of pain" you mean that I'm unable to state a true
> proposition of the form "The pain Karl suffered on occasion x was
> greater than the pain he suffered on occasion y," that's simply false,

You are clearly ignorant of the physiological/psychological mechanisms
for pain. Do you think people in shock from trauma experience pain the
same as those not in shock?

> and contrary to common sense. Don't doctors make such judgments all the
> time? And don't they compare the pain someone *would* suffer in one
> hypothetical situation to the pain they would suffer in another? Here
> there is no question of an actual comparison on the patient's part,
> since it is possible pains, not actual pains, that are being compared by
> the doctor.

Again you want to posit an extreme example and use it to support another
claim entirely. We're talking about discrimination of small differences,
not excitation of x neurons (a scratch) and excitation of 100000x
neurons (cut off finger). Yes, you can make general comparisons of
responses to grossly different physical stimuli, so what? That's why
arguing by analogy is seldom efficacious, constructing a suitable
analogy is not only difficult, but requires a complete understanding of
the system/idea/unit for which it is the analogue.

>>> For * to be true, Karl doesn't have to know it's true or do a
>>> comparison. By this morning, let's say for the sake of argument, he'd
>>> forgotten all about yesterday.
>>>
>>> There is a difference between something's being true (about Karl) and
>>> Karl's knowing it to be true.
>>
>>
>> No, there is not, not when Karls perception is the subject at hand.
>
>
> Well, I guess we just disagree there. One example would be where Karl
> sees a blue color patch (and, as expected, it looks blue to him) but
> then forgets what color it was. Now he sees another patch and it also
> looks blue. There is the same perceived color, but he doesn't know that
> they are the same.

Wrong again. Ask Karl what two colors he saw. Blue. Same. Test over. He
made the comparison at each time of viewing, and identified the color as
blue. How does this support your position? He compared each perception
against his internal references for color, and made an ID.

> Or Karl's visual experience of the blue patch can last 2 seconds but he
> loses track of time. He does not know how long it lasted. (Or would
> you say it can last 2 seconds only if he knows that it does?)

Both silly and irrelevant.

>
>> *YOU* do not, cannot, and will never have the capacity by which to
>> judge Karl's perception of events. You are trying to project what
>> *you* believe to be an absolute level (in this case pain) of response,
>> based on *your* personal psychological/physiological makeup, onto Karl
>> and assume that holds true for all circumstances. This is untenable.
>
> How does the truth of * has anything to do with *me* or my projections?
> It is true independently of whether I exist, certainly.

No, it exists only relative to Karls experience. *You* are trying to say
that you can judge Karls perceptions...even the ones he doesn't have.

> But I disagree with your claim that people other than Karl never have
> the capacity to make true judgments about his perceptual states.

Drop the "states", unless you mean that as a dodge. We're not talking
about a mental state, we're talking about Karls basic perception - not
at all the same.

<snip>
>
>> I'm aware. How is this different? Answer...it's not. All Karl has to
>> do is repeat *EXACTLY* what he did above. He say's to himself, "Hmmmm,
>> I like A better than B, logic dictates that they must be different".
>> And he's already shown he can decide which he likes better. It is a
>> matter of the most rudimetary logic to extrapolate the "I like A more
>> than B" to A is different than B.
>
>
> Sure, replicate one kind of test within the other!

Are you purposely misunderstanding me? Look, Karl performs one test in
which he was repeatedly able to say that A was 2-level satisfaction, and
B was 9-level satisfaction. He can differentiate the two.

> Give Karl a pencil
> and paper, replicate the ratings test within the same/different
> protocol, and all will be well.

No recording is needed. *HE CAN DIFFERENTIATE THE TWO* - He already
showed that.

> But you have illustrated my point. The
> way the same/different test is set up, it's not likely that Karl will do
> this, nor is he encouraged to do this. Karl's attention is focused
> differently in the two tests; the demands are different. We are talking
> about two different psychological experiments, and the mechanisms a
> subject will employ in following their instructions are likely to be
> different, even if it would be possible for someone, bending over
> backwards, to satisfy one protocol by performing the other.

In either test, he can tell he likes one better. He's already shown
that. He will not be able to determine that they are the same when he
likes one better. His brain doesn't get rewired for each test.

<snip>
>
>> ...just don't snip the part about supposing a set of results, while
>> stipulating a methodology that precludes any chance of achieving those
>> results, and then pretending that the method has rigor.
>
>
> Sorry if you felt I should retain this in the quotations (so here it is)

Retain what you choose, but to snip the basis for a statement is rather
poor form.

Keith Hughes
Anonymous
a b } Memory
August 1, 2005 7:29:06 PM

Archived from groups: rec.audio.high-end (More info?)

On 29 Jul 2005 15:47:24 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
wrote:

>Stewart Pinkerton wrote:
>> On 26 Jul 2005 00:48:25 GMT, "Mark DeBellis" <mad1@columbia.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >There is a third possibility in addition to thinking that A and B are
>> >identical and thinking that they are different, which is not to judge
>> >the matter either way. Can it not be the case that a person enjoys A
>> >more than he enjoys B while failing to judge them either the same or
>> >different? What if he simply does not consider the matter?
>>
>> What if he doesn't care? What if *we* don't care?
>
>Not sure I understand your question, but I thought this group was in
>part about something called the objectivist/subjectivist debate, and
>it's not irrelevant to spell out the basic assumptions behind the
>views.

No, I was simply trying to point out that you have posted thousands of
lines of agonising about how we know what we know, apparently without
ever considering that it's very simple just to go try it for yourself.

--

Stewart Pinkerton | Music is Art - Audio is Engineering
!