China's rate of quantum computing research and development is expected to slow down in the coming years, following the US' announcement of the finalized (and clarified) guardrails around its multi-billion-dollar CHIPS and Science Act. The fact that these new clarifications include provisions specifically aimed at quantum computing is a strong indication of just how concerningly close we are to achieving useful enough forms of it.
The guardrails around the CHIPS and Science Act, as issued by the Department of Commerce through NIST, seek to "prevent funding provided through the program from being used to directly or indirectly benefit foreign countries of concern." It's through this lens that the Department of Commerce has classified semiconductors as "critical to national security," subjecting them to increased scrutiny due to their obvious ability to increase a foreign country of concern's technological level.
And apparently, "semiconductors designed for quantum information systems" make the cut. Other clarifications include "Semiconductors designed for operation in cryogenic environments (at or below 77 Kelvin), which includes sensors for quantum computing and superconductor research. "Silicon photonic semiconductors," too, have quantum computing applications. "Semiconductors utilizing nanomaterials, including 1D and 2D carbon allotropes such as graphene and carbon nanotubes" also make the cut.
From a technological perspective, the US covered a lot of ground with these guardrails. But increasingly, it seems that our world isn't exactly what it seems.
Around a year ago, we reported that the United States intended to extend the tapestry of trade restrictions and sanctions toward quantum computing. And now it's happened. But there are many difficulties with technologically restricting a "foreign country of concern" in a globalized world (logistics and international business relations is just one of them).
One of the most fundamental of those difficulties is simply the scope of design and application of semiconductors: Tthey fit everywhere and can be made to aid in performing almost anything. Semiconductors themselves being "critical" would be an unenforceable policy. Hence a need to clarify what exactly these semiconductors "critical to national security" are.
The questions around sanctions, of course, almost always relate to how effective they are. Do these sanctions slow down the "opposition" more than they slow us down? In the case of quantum, the case isn't as clear-cut as one might expect. But then again, we've been seeing sanctions falling short of their intended, projected effects for a while now. There are always back-alleys and gray markets. And there's also the ability to simply cram and outinvent the US's restrictions, which China seems to be doing in some ways.
