AMI's UEFI Signing Key and BIOS Source Code Leaked
A publicly accessible FTP server in Taiwan has leaked the source code for AMI’s Aptio UEFI BIOS.
AMI’s Aptio UEFI BIOS source code and its unique UEFI signing key has been leaked onto a publicly accessible FTP server in Taiwan, an event that may have compromised the security of every motherboard running AMI Aptio. The release of the latter item malware gives developers the ability to develop “signed” malicious BIOS updates, replace legitimate system BIOS updates, and gain access to most ring-0 OS functions.
Adam Caudill, who discovered the open FTP server along with Brandon Wilson, characterized the leak as a “dream come true for advanced corporate espionage or intelligence operations” and further added that “the ability to create a nearly undetectable, permanent hole in a system's security is an ideal scenario for covert information collection.”
The industry blogger also cited motherboard vendor, Jetway, as being responsible for placing the files on the unsecured FTP server, a claim that has yet to be conclusively verified. In AMI’s official statement, the company confirmed that the leak took place and noted that the "leaky FTP server" was run by one of AMI's customers. Therefore, the leak of the data was not "the fault of AMI and by extension not a result of a security lapse on AMI’s behalf."
With regard to the severity of the threat, AMI seemed to disagree with Adam Caudill, as they do not view it as a "general security threat" which could “create a nearly undetectable, permanent hole in a system’s security" and advised all concerned parties to contact an AMI Sales Representative or AMI Technical Marketing for further information.
Subramonian Shankar, American Megatrends CEO and President, further commented that “while today’s news is certainly distressing, AMI would like to reassure its customers and partners in no uncertain terms that this should not be a security concern for them. If they follow standard operating procedure for BIOS signing, the security features in our BIOS source code and secure signing process will function as designed and remain 100% secure.”
http://ami.com/News/PressRelease/?PrID=392
1. Trick user into visiting an trusted but infected website, or a website with infected advertisements.
2. Load a self-replicating rootkit onto the computer, which then identifies what mobo the computer has. Any USB drives or external storage will also be compromised.
3. Detect AMI mobo, start BIOS replacement when the computer is restarted so Windows can install updates. Many users won't suspect anything, thinking it's just the Windows update. Only experienced users will become suspicious.
4. Open backdoors after BIOS is replaced. Let the fun begin.
Telling customers to call sales reps about security issues. That's good advice.
We don't want to worry if our mobo is not affected and we want to be cautious if ours is.
All my Windows 7 is completely updated, so I know what to look for, although I have an ASRock Mobo.
UEFI does not really add much security and secure boot lockout is a terrible idea.
I have a sister who doesn't care about computer security. When I brought up the bot-net topic, her reply, "Yeah, well I'm not stupid enough to click on spam sent by bots."
My mom? Still thinks Windows XP's Service Pack 3 is a virus.
My dad? Still thinks McAfee 2007 OAS is sufficient. Though OAS's support was shut down before 2012.
Secure boot is horrible.
I totally agree. The default Secure UEFI (using predetermined keys) will have the opposite effect on security. I know to many it sounds counter-intuitive but its considered "Security through Obscurity" which is a extra risky way to secure data. You don't know if its secure or not ultimately. Here's the deal on that, how can I be sure that someone nefarious, OR any number of global government entities don't already have the signing keys? I can't, so I presume they have the ability to inject something into signed and trusted driver package from a trusted source. Bad guys aren't going to expose that they found a hole, they'll sit on it and exploit it. Hence I'd want to compile and sign all driver and UEFI code going onto the corporate computers for a better defense in depth strategy. Since MS shares its source code with govt entities, it is in my viewpoint insecure by default. How can you defend against the Russian, Chinese and US sponsored crackers when they have the source code (and presumably also the signing keys) and you and your security team don't?
In the end that just leaves open source solutions for the security conscious out there. I do think Secure UEFI using your own signed keys has some nice potential though. That would seriously limit the scope of any attack on signed kernel drivers and on the underlying system firmware.
Agree!
Doctorow's Law:
Anytime someone puts a lock on something you own, against your wishes, and doesn't give you the key, they're not doing it for your benefit.
But yes...MS manage to sell us on idea that UEFI Secure Boot is good for us while they still hold all the keys.
The "bad guys" have much more financial incentives to break/circumvent boot security, than the "good guys" do. Sadly the UEFI key's are bound to be leaked at some point in time.
I have a sister who doesn't care about computer security. When I brought up the bot-net topic, her reply, "Yeah, well I'm not stupid enough to click on spam sent by bots."
My mom? Still thinks Windows XP's Service Pack 3 is a virus.
My dad? Still thinks McAfee 2007 OAS is sufficient. Though OAS's support was shut down before 2012.
Hopefully, I'm protected with 2 AVs; Trend Micro Titanium and AVG 2013 full ed.